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’The litmus test of the morality of any society is  
how it provides for its most vulnerable members’1
 
 
The conviction that the international community of States has a duty to 
provide refugees with protection and find solutions to their problem dates back to the 
League of Nations. When the United Nations replaced the League of Nations in 1945, 
it recognised from the outset that the task of caring for refugees was a matter of 
international concern and that in keeping with the charter, the community of States 
should assume collective responsibility for those fleeing persecution2. The 
international refugee protection regime was formed in 1951 by the signing on of the 
Refugee Convention3 which established the legal framework of the protection regime.  
 
International protection is the system which has been devised by the 
international community to enable refugees to gain access to the safety and security 
which they are compelled to seek away from home. It makes it possible for them as 
persons who have lost or are unable to claim national protection in both its legal and 
territorial sense, to find another approximate, extra-territorial framework to secure 
their lives, safety and liberty.4 Its specific purpose is to ensure that those whose basic 
rights are not protected (for a Convention reason) in their own country, are if able to 
                                                          
1 Submission of the South African Council of Churches to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
meeting on Social Development on the Social Assistance Bill [B57-2003] 
2 George Okoth-Obbo, “Does Refugee Protection In Africa Need Mediation” Track Two Vol 9 No 3 
p1 
3 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 
4 op cit (note 2) 
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reach an asylum state, entitled to invoke rights of substitute protection in any state 
party to the Convention5.  
 
The idea was that those people fleeing persecution should be able to cross 
international borders and find protection in their countries of refuge6.  The 
cornerstone of international refugee protection is article 33 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the principle of non-refoulement or non-return7.  This principle is also 
reflected in the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention in article 2(3).  Like the right to seek 
and enjoy asylum, it is considered to be a principle of customary international law, 
binding all States whether or not they are States parties to the relevant international 
instruments.  However, both logic and the law require that international protection 
encompass much more than respect for the principle of non-refoulement8.   
 
Thus a central tenet of the 1951 Refugee Convention is that refugees as 
‘human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination’9.  
This is to enable them to not only seek but also to enjoy asylum. There are three main 
international legal instruments that are applicable for this purpose in South Africa. 
The first is the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and the third is Africa's own 
continental refugee instrument, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.  
 
                                                          
5 This is according to Professor Hathaway in his, The Rights of Refugees under International Law 2005 
at 5. He goes on to emphasise the point that, “In pith and substance, refugee law is not immigration law 
at all, but rather is a system for the surrogate or substitute protection of human rights. 
6 Refuge itself of course ultimately had to come to an end. Therefore, the attainment of a durable 
solution, either through integration in the country of refuge, or by being able to return voluntarily and 
in safety to the country of origin, was just as cardinal an objective of the system of international 
protection and is an important one to preserve. This is according to Okoth-Obbo (note2) 
7 It provides that ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler ") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’ 
8 This is because to survive in the country of asylum, the refugee needs to have some means of 
subsistence, as well as shelter, health care and other basic necessities.  This entails obtaining some form 
of recognized legal status, providing authorization to work, or at least access to humanitarian 
assistance, social benefits, and documentation.  Refugees also need respect for the other fundamental 
human rights to which all individuals are entitled without discrimination beyond what is required for 
immediate survival. 
9 This is set out in the preamble of the Convention highlighting the fundamental importance of 
recognising refugee rights as human rights and their need for equal treatment when it came to the 
respect of human rights generally.  
 5
The system of refugee protection elaborated in these instruments sets down 
criteria for claiming the protections they establish, the key element being the 
definition of a refugee. According to the 1951 Convention, a refugee is a person who, 
because of:  
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or 
owing to such fear, is unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.10
 
The 1969 OAU Convention employs this definition of a refugee as well and further 
adds what is commonly referred to as the ‘expanded OAU definition’11. It provides 
that:  
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing 
public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality 
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in 
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.12
 
Persons or groups who meet these criteria are owed the obligation to be treated 
in accordance with certain human rights and refugee-specific standards.  International 
protection, like national protection, is therefore based on human rights principles 
which respect the inherent dignity of the human being.  Being the surrogate protection 
necessary for those for whom national protection of their fundamental human rights 
has demonstrably failed them, it necessarily follows that the standard of attainment of 
international protection must be equated with the quality of the core protection a 
national is owed by her State13.  
                                                          
10 Article 1 of the UN Refugee Convention, 1951  
11 This Convention was an explicit recognition by African states of the nature and scope of modern 
refugee movements in Africa at the time. This was during the wars of independence in Africa where 
refugee protection was an expression of solidarity with the struggle for independence and refugees 
were accepted as fellow comrades. It indicated the willingness of post- independent African states to 
take responsibility for the protection of persons forcibly displaced under these circumstances. See J 
Schneider in his ‘The Refugee Crisis In Southern and Central Africa’ Global Dialogue, Volume 4.1 
April 1999 
12Article 1(2) of the 1969 OAU Convention 
13 This is a position that is also advanced by WARIPNET & Human Rights First in their paper titled 
‘From response to solutions – strengthening the protection of refugees through economic, social and 
cultural rights’, A Discussion Paper on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Refugees in West 
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 In South Africa this right to equal treatment and respect for one’s human 
rights is enshrined in the Constitution14 15 which guarantees an extensive set of rights 
to all without discrimination. The Constitution strives to achieve political, civil as 
well as socio-economic equality for all in response to the inequality that existed in all 
spheres and was at the root of the wrongs of the past in South Africa16. It is within the 
above understanding of the core obligations of international protection that this paper 
examines the short comings of the policy implementation of the rights contained in 
the Refugees Act17 within the greater constitutional context of realising rights for all 
who live in South Africa.  
 
In the ten years since the end of apartheid, South Africa has made a 
remarkable transformation from a refugee-producing country to a foremost 
destination for refugees and asylum seekers from all over Africa and beyond South 
Africa has created a refugee system whereby all the refugees are urban refugees18 and 
where local integration has been deemed to be the most appropriate temporary 
assistance strategy19. This system is at a nascent stage at the moment with the legal 
framework being only five years old in existence and already fundamental problems 
have come to the fore with respect to the integration of the refugee population in 
South Africa.   
 
Refugees coming to South Africa seeking protection are faced with a myriad 
of obstacles, most of which stem from the lack of timely adjudication of their refugee 
claims by the Department of Home Affairs, the lack of understanding of refugees and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Africa, which was presented during the 51st meeting of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, Geneva, October 2000  
14 Constitution of South Africa, 1996 
15 The importance of this document is also emphasised in the Draft Refugee White Paper which sets out 
the refugee policy when the government stated that, ‘As far as refugees are concerned, the government 
recognises that its responsibilities and obligations, and the quality and quantity of the measures which 
it is called upon to deliver pursuant to these obligations are set out in an essentially mandatory manner 
in international legal and human rights standards. The government has assumed these obligations both 
through its accession to the relevant international refugee and human rights instruments and by 
incorporating a number of basic principles and standards in the Constitution of the country.  
16 C Heyns ‘Advancing Social Justice in South Africa Through Economic and Social Rights – From 
The Margins to the Main Stream’ ESR Review Vol. 1 No. 1 March 1998 p1 
17 The Refugees Act 130 of 1998 which sets out the legal framework and structure for the 
implementation and fulfilment of South Africa’s Convention obligations.   
18 This is a term coined by UNHCR and only really used in Africa 
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asylum seekers of their rights and the services at their disposal, and the discrimination 
that refugees and asylum seekers are faced with from the rest of society. 
 
1.2 Main Purpose and Central Argument  
 
This paper is a critique of the implementation of the progressive refugee 
protection through the local integration policy that has been established by the South 
African Government. It is premised on the belief that the South African government 
has failed to create an ‘enabling environment for refugees’20 and that this failure 
makes it imperative for the South Africa government to remove the exclusion of 
refugees from their social security scheme.  The case put forward by this paper is that 
the inclusion of refugees into the South African social security scheme will not only 
improve the quality of its refugee protection policies but it will make them more 
compatible with constitutional standards.  
 
The central argument of the paper is that the South African refugee policy 
does not go far enough in allowing refugees access to all the rights that it is mandated 
to by the Constitution, in particular the right to access social assistance which is 
guaranteed in s27 (1) (c) of the Constitution21. It argues that there is a need for the 
refugee policy to facilitate access by refugees to all the rights that they are entitled to 
in terms of the Constitution in light of the challenges that they face in trying to 
integrate in South Africa. It highlights the critical need for this access to be given to 
extremely vulnerable refugees in light of the  inadequacy of the policy 
implementation, particularly the failure to create the so-called ‘enabling environment’ 
necessary to facilitate local integration as a temporary assistance strategy. 
 
This is seen as one of the best ways in which the consequences of refugees’ 
failure to integrate due to the lack of an enabling environment can be mitigated in 
such a way that they can live lives of dignity. This paper proposes that this failure to 
create the crucial enabling environment necessary for the successful integration of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19 This is in terms of the Draft Refugee White Paper of 1998 which sets out the refugee policy for 
South Africa and is discussed in more detail below 
20 The meaning of this concept is discussed in more detail below in Chapter 2 when the rationale 
behind the creation of the local integration strategy is discussed in greater depth. 
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refugees makes it critical for the government to provide refugees with material 
assistance to assist them to build meaningful lives that take into account their human 
dignity as defined in the Constitution.  
 
This is because the policy of excluding extremely vulnerable refugees from 
accessing social security or from providing them with material assistance in the face 
of the pursuit of exclusionary policies which deny them entrance to some of the most 
accessible jobs, failure to recognise their qualifications, for instance, has led to 
extreme poverty and vulnerability of some segments of the refugee population in 
South Africa22 making the realisation of refugees’ right to social assistance of critical 
importance, especially in light o f the fact that it is unconstitutional23.  
 
The role of the Constitution has become critical for the refugee protection 
discourse in South Africa as its local integration solution without a right to social 
assistance or recourse to some sort of material assistance impairs the rights and 
human dignity of extremely vulnerable refugees, necessitating the need for it to be 
enhanced in its essential human rights-oriented and refugee-centered character.  This 
is because the Constitution mandates the government to observe a particular human 
right standard in its treatment of all who live in South Africa. The assertion is that the 
Constitution can be used as an instrument of social change to facilitate this inclusion 
as it has the transformative potential as a visionary document24 aimed at establishing a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights25  
 
The argument is that what is needed in this situation is a granting of social 
assistance to refugees to restore the central position of protection priorities which can 
be done by looking at Constitutional court jurisprudence on socio-economic rights 
                                                                                                                                                                      
21 s 27 (1) (c) provides that ‘Everyone has the right to have access to social security, including, if they 
are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance’ 
22 This is in spite of the fact that refugees have formal rights in terms of not only the International 
Conventions that South Africa is a signatory to, but also South Africa’s new Constitution and its 
Refugees Act.  
23 This is because Refugees are entitled to all the rights in the Bill of Rights in terms of s27 of the 
Refugees Act 130 of 1998 and the right to access social security is guaranteed in s27 (1) (c) of the 
Constitution. This is discussed in more detail below.  
24 This is because as South Africa emerged from despotic, apartheid rule in 1994, into the international 
arena it not only pledged itself to observe and uphold a number of international human rights treaties 
but it also enshrined as its highest law one of the most progressive Constitutions in the world. See 
Heyns supra at (note14) 
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which, it is argued, set minimum standards of protection for the government. These 
Constitutional pronouncements on the realisation of socio-economic rights such as 
social assistance are seen as being best placed to address this problem and to assist the 
South African government in bringing their policy delivery regarding refugee 
protection in line with its international and Constitutional obligations26.  
 
This means therefore that government is under a real obligation to provide 
social assistance to recognized refugees and with regards to asylum seekers27 there 
are minimum standards of protection that must be applied guided by Constitutional 
principles. The pursuit of particular policies, which facilitate exclusion of refugees 
from their ambit such as the Social Security Act,28  is unconstitutional because it does 
not meet Convention obligations and Constitutional standards.  
 
The provision of material or social assistance is a necessary step towards the 
achievement of a more constitutionally sound legal standard of refugee protection in 
South Africa.  This is in light of the fact that the government is required to promote 
and protect the rights, including socio-economic rights, of all who live in it under its 
liberal and progressive Constitution. This is a significant time in South African 
history for critical discourse on refugee protection to be undertaken in the context of 
the government’s obligation to progressively realise rights for all, at a time when 
government is trying to build the constitutional democracy envisaged by the 
Constitution and to build a South African society based on a human rights culture.  
 
Constitutionally speaking the acceptable standard for refugee protection is one 
that is equal to the standard of human rights protection that is afforded to South 
African nationals. It is premised on the Constitutional imperative that the rights 
contained in Bill of rights are guaranteed for all who live in South Africa and are 
meant to be realised in a society founded on values of human dignity, equality and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
25 This is contained in the preamble of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996 
26 This is also in light of the fact that there exist no internationally defined standards which articulate 
minimum standards of treatment that are imposed by the Convention obligations.  
27 An asylum seeker is a person who has come to South Africa and has applied for asylum, for recognition as a 
refugee and whose case is pending before the DHA.  The Department of Home Affairs then makes a decision 
about whether the asylum seeker qualifies as a refugee based on the above criteria.  An asylum seeker is legal in 
South Africa if he or she is in possession of a valid Section 22 Permit under the Refugees Act or a Section 23 
asylum permit under Immigration Act 2002The Refugees Act states that an asylum seeker’s application should be 
determined within a six-month period but the process usually takes much longer. 
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freedom for all. The Refugees Act does not go far enough in granting these rights in 
so far as it does not make provision for the provision of material assistance and in its 
failure to give refugees the ability to access state funded social assistance.  
 
The Constitutional Court stressed the point that the inclusion of economic and 
social rights in the Constitution represents a commitment to achieving substantive  
equality in South Africa when it stated that, ‘The Constitution promises us a future in 
which equality will not merely be an empty and formalistic shell, but a living 
reality’.29  This has obvious implications for the achievement of equality for refugees 
in the socio-economic sphere and is one of the main principles on which the argument 
for an equal standard of treatment is based.A critical assertion that this paper makes is 
that the Refugees Act should ensure this constitutional standard of legal protection for 
refugees, a standard which is supported by the Convention spirit and obligations.  
 
 The inadequacies that are identified as being inherent in the South African 
refugee protection system clearly reflect inadequacies in socio-economic rights 
protections which necessitates the need for the local integration assistance strategy to 
be approached from an all-embracing rights perspective. This in light of the fact that it 
is not sufficient to view refugee protection as a combination of civil and political 
rights protection as refugee protection demands a rights-based approach which 
embraces economic, social and cultural rights.  The Constitution defines a certain 
standard of living that people in South Africa are entitled to, thus it guarantees for 
example, the right to dignity and the right to particular assistance from the 
government to enable one to achieve this. 
 
This means that, for example, in the South African context where most of the 
refugee rights have been framed in such a manner that they mostly place a negative 
obligation on the government, there is a need for the government to also take some 
sort of positive action to be able to properly meet all their convention obligations, 
especially socio-economic rights. Thus it is not enough for the government to simply 
guarantee refugees’ rights to work for instance, but it is imperative for them to also 
implement positive obligations such as the provision of social or material assistance. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 
29 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC)  
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The argument is that the manner in which the government is implementing the 
Refugees Act as it currently stands, fails to give refugees the ability to live the life of 
dignity guaranteed to them by the Constitution as it does not go far enough in 
addressing their unique vulnerabilities and the particular challenges that they face. So 
while refugees have the right to work for instance, most of their qualifications are not 
recognised by the South African labour market, making them economically 
vulnerable and susceptible to unemployment and poverty. 
 
 This then raises the need or necessity for the government to provide some sort 
of material assistance to refugees, which assistance should be available, in response to 
the inherent difficulty that refugees can be expected to have in integrating in a foreign 
country. This is also in light of the fact that the Constitution mandates that right for all 
who are resident in South Africa. 
 
This paper turns to Constitutional Court jurisprudence on the realisation of 
national’s socio-economic rights to make an argument for the inclusion of refugees 
into the social security scheme. One of the main underlying assumptions of this thesis 
is that there are emerging standards of protection that are being established by the 
Constitutional Court in this regard. The main reasons for this assumption are 
advanced from an in depth analysis of Constitutional Court jurisprudence in this area 
of the government’s obligations in the realisation of socio-economic rights concerning 
nationals. Secondly South Africa has protection responsibilities in terms of its refugee 
legislation that include elements of socio-economic rights. Thirdly the Constitutional 
Court rulings give cause to believe that foreigners (especially refugees) should be 
included in such protections and, moreover, that there are standards of protection that 
are applicable to foreigners and citizens.  
 
1.3 The broader socio-economic and legal context 
 
The proposed critique of the South African refugee policy has to be 
understood and explored within the broader concept of international refugee 
protection. It is argued that this concept of refugee protection, which was created by 
the 1951 Convention and its Protocol and the OAU convention of 1969, can be 
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utilized to strengthen the human rights centered character of the local integration 
policy in South Africa.  This is because the essential function of the protection regime 
was to ensure that those compelled to flee or remain outside their country of origin 
because of danger to their lives and liberties were admitted into another30 and once 
there, their safety and human rights had to be guaranteed.  
 
The state authorities in the country of asylum were obliged to assure them 
social, economic and community rights in the most fulsome manner possible31. It is in 
this context, that the refugee protection regime is supposed to guarantee refugees 
access to safety, security and the ability to recreate the normalcy and fulsomeness of a 
human life to the greatest degree possible in their countries of refuge or asylum32 and 
the argument contained in this paper is that the South African government will be able 
to achieve this kind of protection regime by the inclusion of refugees into the social 
security scheme or at least by providing some sort of material assistance to the 
extremely vulnerable members of their communities.   
 
One of the reasons why there is a reliance on constitutional standards in this 
paper is because there is no mechanism which enables signatory states to be held 
accountable for the implementation of their convention obligations nor a supervisory 
body that can articulate best practices, minimum standards of treatment that are 
consistent with the nature of their convention obligations and in line with the sprit and 
purport of the convention itself and the intention of its drafters. The argument is that 
there has to therefore be reliance on domestic courts to ensure adequate minimum 
standards of protection.  
 
 It is suggested that in the absence of a specific international guiding standard 
with regard to refugee protection, domestic legislation and practice can be a useful 
guide in the creation of practical and acceptable minimum standards of protection. 
Domestic law and standards can be used as guiding principles of expected standards 
of treatment of refugees and domestic institutions and mechanisms can be used to 
                                                          




hold states accountable to their convention obligations in the absence of an 
international mechanism or institution33.  
 
The proposition is that one can look at the standards of protection of nationals 
in individual countries and that these can then form the basis on which governments 
can formulate comprehensible rights regarding policy with regard to refugees in their 
territory. The area of social security has been identified as being one of the most 
undefined areas of refugee protection in terms of clearly defined standards and in 
terms of existing clearly articulated minimum core obligations. And yet it is 
simultaneously one of the most critical areas needing minimum standards for this 
extremely vulnerable population group.  
 
 
1.4 Outline of paper 
 
The next section looks firstly at the history of the evolution of the South 
African refugee policy and the rationale behind the local integration strategy. This is 
canvassed quite broadly to give an understanding of what the refugee protection 
landscape was supposed to look like. One can, once armed with this understanding, 
appreciate why the government might have deemed it unnecessary to include refugees 
in the social security scheme.  
 
The realities of the refugee’s life on the ground are then canvassed covered 
quite extensively as evidence of why there is an urgent need for a reconsideration of 
government exclusionary policy with regard to social security. The argument is that in 
light of the harsh realities that refugee face there is a real need for South Africa to 
include them in their poverty alleviation and material assistance schemes as a way of 
maintaining a credible rights based protection system.  The whole section provides an 
understanding of South Africa’s position, policy and the challenges it faces. 
 
A look at the history and nature of socio-economic rights is then undertaken in 
an attempt to properly frame the issue of the justiciability of the right to social 
                                                          
33 The idea is that we can harness and utilise the rights consciousness of democratic societies to garner 
support and for the preservation of a necessary and useful protection system. 
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assistance and to examine how useful socio-economic rights as such can be utilised as 
a tool in setting minimum standards of protection. This is followed by an analysis of 
Constitutional Court judgments on socio-economic rights and how they establish a 
right for the inclusion of refugees into the Social Security scheme. This is then 




Chapter Two: Refugee Policies in South Africa and Their 
Practical Impact 
 
2.1 Setting the context 
 
Migration has become one of the hallmarks of the contemporary period. Despite its 
prevalence, few African governments or public institutions are positioned to manage 
the social, economic, and political demands of providing humanitarian assistance or to 
address the consequences of displacement and humanitarian action34 and South Africa 
is no exception to this35. With the passing of the recent Refugees Act 130 of 199836, 
South Africa has now set in place a legal framework as a response aimed at properly 
managing the absorption of forced migrants37, particularly refugees and asylum 
seekers into the South African community and to provide for the necessary legal 
protection of refugees38, who form a sub class of this community of forced migrants.  
 
This new legislation created both ethical and legal obligations for South Africa 
to provide protection to the refugees and asylum seekers within its territory.39 This 
Act gives expression to all the core values of international protection as it provides the 
legal basis for the protection of refugees in South Africa, which is consistent with the 
principles that are enshrined in international and regional instruments40. As mentioned 
above the presence of and the protection of refugees in South Africa are a relatively 
new phenomenon.  
                                                          
34 L Landau (Draft) Proposal to Establish an African Forced Migration Research and Training Network 
22 May 2005 
35 ibid 
36 This Act came into effect on the 1st of April 2000 with the passing of its Regulations. Upon 
enactment the government established machinery for the management of refugee affairs, including the 
establishment of systems and procedures for registration and status determination, refugee records and 
a database and the issuance of refugee documents among others. 
37 Above (note 34) 
38 It can arguably be said that in theory, South Africa has managed to legislatively create a modern, 
progressive and superior refugee protection system which is in line with the spirit and letter of the 
Conventions governing refugee protection. 
39 The beginning of 1996 saw South Africa finally become a signatory to all three major international 
instruments pertaining to international migration: the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1967 UN Protocol 
and the 1969 OAU Convention. 
40 This was reflected in the Government policy position as enumerated by the Home Affairs Director 
General in the White Paper where he stated that, “The granting of asylum to refugees and their 
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Until the early 1990s, South Africa was a net producer of exiles and refugees 
and, except for the hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans who fled into South Africa 
during that country’s civil war, received relatively few asylum seekers or refugees41. 
It was only in mid-1990s that South Africa began signing legislation and conventions 
creating the ‘refugee’ as a legal category42.  
 
Unlike most other African countries refugees and asylum seekers are not 
accommodated in refugee camps where they are dependent on material assistance 
from the local government, UNHCR and civil society.  South Africa has instead put in 
place a protection system whereby refugees in South Africa are characterized as urban 
refugees.43 The policy of local integration44 was seen as being the best temporary 
assistance strategy for the duration of their stay in South Africa since they were going 
to be urban refugees45. They are expected to fully integrate themselves into the South 
African society and they are expected to be fully functional and self-sufficient and to 
do all this with virtually no special assistance or privileges from the government46, 
which does not have a public relief program for refugees.  
 
The South African Government stated in the Policy Paper on Refugee issues 
that it did not have the financial capacity to offer material assistance to refugees and 
asylum seekers. The government believed that given the high unemployment and 
limited resources available to nationals, it lacked concrete means to enable self-
                                                                                                                                                                      
protection in South African territory is a matter fundamentally of securing human rights protection.” 
Draft Refugee White Paper submitted by the White Paper for Refugee Affairs Task Team 1998 p2 
41 Landau, LB (Draft) ‘Background Paper for Open Hearing on Xenophobia and Problems Relating to 
It’ October 2004 p2 
42 ibid. 
43 The total number of asylum applications received from 1994-2003 is 152,414.  Of these, 26 624 have 
been granted refugee status while 39,578 have been rejected.  The remainder are still awaiting 
adjudication. 
44 The meaning of local integration as set out in international refugee conventions, refers to the granting 
of full and permanent asylum, membership and residency status, by the host government. It takes 
places through a process of legal, economic, social and cultural incorporation of refugees, culminating 
in the offer of citizenship. This is according to Jacobsen, K ‘Local Integration; The Forgotten Solution’ 
p1 Local integration in the South African context excludes an automatic right to permanent asylum and 
the ability to apply for citizenship however. 
45 The government acknowledged that full protection of refugees required the attainment of a degree of 
self-sufficiency and local integration within the host community for the duration of their exile. 
Paragraph 4.8.2.1 of the Local Integration Section of the Draft Refugee White Paper  
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sufficiency for refugees47. The government acknowledged that since it did not have 
the financial capacity to provide material assistance to refugees it would seek instead 
to create an enabling environment, which would facilitate the successful integration of 
refugees. 
 
This was to be achieved by legislative, regulatory and administrative 
measures, such as the issuing of identity cards and travel documents, the granting of 
the right to work and study, the speeding up of eligibility procedures to guarantee 
security of status. Public awareness was also to be raised in order to sensitise the local 
population to the plight of refugees, explain the differences between refugees and 
economic migrants, and emphasise the need for acceptance and understanding48. 
 
To enable refugees49 to integrate, the Refugees Act has literally given to them 
most of the rights vested in its citizenry, i.e. all the rights in the Bill of Rights except 
those guaranteed to citizens50.  The understanding was that it was only by becoming 
self-sufficient that refugees could lead a productive life, which would make them 
assets to their host country and facilitate their integration within the local community. 
They believed that by allowing refugees to use their skills or develop new ones while 
in exile would facilitate meaningful reintegration in their countries of origin when 







                                                                                                                                                                      
46 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) funds certain NGO’s to provide 
legal and social assistance to refugees. This is a very limited amount and it is only for newly arrived 
asylum seekers and extremely vulnerable refugees and it is for a very limited period. 
47 Paragraph 4.8.2.2 of the Local Integration Section in the Draft Refugee White Paper 
48 Paragraph 4.8.2.2 of the Local Integration Section of the Draft Refugee White Paper  
49  An individual is not considered a refugee until they have been recognised as such by South Africa’s 
Department of Home Affairs. Once granted refugee status/asylum, refugees are entitled to a set of 
rights and subject to a set of regulations, for the duration of their refugee status. Until such time as an 
individual’s application for refugee status is accepted or rejected, they are considered an asylum seeker. 
50 These are mainly the political rights such as the right to vote and the right to stand for political 
office. 
51 Paragraph 4.8.2.1 of the Local Integration Section of the Draft Refugee White Paper  
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2.2 Failure of implementation of the local integration initiative 
 
There has however been a failure on the part of the South African government 
to create this enabling environment which was intended to assist refugees in becoming 
self reliant and successfully integrated during their time in exile in a foreign and often 
hostile and xenophobic environment, which undermines the quality of its refugee 
protection policies and initiatives which are based on a progressive piece of 
legislation and the Constitution52. 
 
 Although it has established a legal framework for refugee protection, in 
practice the government of South Africa has not done much in the area of facilitating 
the local integration of refugee communities53.  This has impacted adversely on the 
ability of these communities which are already vulnerable and marginalized, to 
integrate successfully into the local community.  
 
Refugees are struggling to fully integrate themselves into the South African 
society as their ability to access their rights has proved to be difficult, as they are 
faced with a myriad of obstacles in their attempt to do so. This is from the 
government’s failure to provide secure and proper recognisable and functional 
documentation54, which impairs the ability of refugees and asylum seekers to access 
jobs and much needed public services55 to the absence of proper public awareness and 
education56.  This necessitates the need for the articulation of minimum standards of 
                                                          
52 Constitution of South Africa, 1996 
53 It must be noted that whilst the UNHCR has the mandate to look after refugees, in the South African 
context it is the government of South Africa that has the primary legal responsibility for refugees.   
54 While refugees are likely to face similar difficulties as the poor local populace in accessing social 
services, refugees face a series of additional challenges in this regard. Those living without proper 
documentation, or where refugee documents are not widely recognized by front-line service providers, 
are unlikely to access public services effectively.   
55 The creation of an enabling environment requires that the government ensure that refugees have 
proper and recognisable identity documents which guarantee a secure legal status and the ability of 
refugees to access critical financial and social services, jobs etc.   
56 Others face communication challenges and are usually faced with service providers that are unaware 
of their special status and their rights, or some are simply not be aware of the services that are available 
or their rights to them.  There are many reports in South Africa that even when documentation is in 
order, migrants are refused services as a result of outright discrimination or xenophobia. With few 
public champions, refugees may have little recourse and will be forced to go without services or seek 
them through private - often informal and unregulated - markets. This is according to Landau, L in his 
Draft) ‘Background Paper for Open Hearing on Xenophobia and Problems Relating to It’ October 2004 
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treatment in accordance with the set legal obligations derived from the act and 
Constitution. 
  
2.3 Refugee Protection in South Africa 
 
As mentioned above, South Africa is a party to a number of international 
instruments57 that guarantee recognised refugees equal protection before the law.  In 
terms of these instruments, those persons recognised by South Africa as refugees have 
the right to basic services, including social assistance. With regard to refugees the 
Convention sets out a number of obligations.  In respect of publicly controlled 
housing and education, other than elementary education, refugees are to be granted 
“treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that 
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances.”  In relation to elementary 
education, public relief and assistance refugees are to get better treatment.  The UN 
Refugee Convention provides that refugees are to get “the same treatment as 
nationals” in these areas58.  
 
This is also in line with the international understanding that human rights are 
not solely the rights of citizens or nationals.  Refugees, too, are entitled to the 
protections offered by human rights law, including those in the area of economic, 
social and cultural rights.  Like all other persons, refugees are entitled to an adequate 
standard of living, adequate food and housing, as well as physical and mental health.  
 
S27 of the Refugees Act provides that recognised refugees are entitled to full 
protection of the law. This includes the rights guaranteed in Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution, including the right to social security. This ‘rights chapter’ in essence 
defines South Africa’s attempt to conceptualise and define their international 
obligations in terms of the international legal framework on refugee protection and is 
where the government’s obligation to observe an acceptable minimum standard 
derives. 
                                                          
57 This includes the ICCPR and the ICSECR OF 1966 which are relevant  as important international  
human rights instruments 
58 ESR Module 7 
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Furthermore and particularly for our purpose the preamble to the Social 
Assistance Bill states that, in terms of the Constitution, everyone has the right to 
social security, not only South African citizens.  The fact that despite all of the above 
refugees and asylums seekers are not included in the social security scheme in South 
Africa and they receive no form of public relief and assistance from the government is 
a cause for concern and underscore the need for minimum standards of treatment and 
protection to be clearly set.  
 
S5 of the Act59 states: “Subject to the provisions of this Act, any person shall 
be entitled to the appropriate social grant if he satisfies the Director-General that he; 
(b) is resident in the Republic at the time of the application in question; (c) is a South 
African citizen; and (d) complies with the prescribed conditions.” This position or 
state of affairs is not only unconstitutional but is arguably a dereliction of duty by the 
South African State of its international obligations and commitments. This is more so 
in view of the fact that South Africa is a country that could provide the best example 
or best argument for the retention of a protection regime because of its progressive 
Constitutional democracy which sets high standards of social protection.  
 
It can arguably be said with conviction that in theory, South Africa has 
managed to legislatively create a progressive and superior refugee protection system. 
It is in line with the spirit and letter of the Conventions governing refugee protection. 
Because of this the South African government should be committed to securing for 
refugees in South Africa full legal protection provided for under international law, 
which includes all the rights in the Bill of Rights as set out in the Constitution (except 
those rights from which non citizens have been expressly excluded). 
 
 This can be achieved by a more human rights focused implementation of the 
Refugee Act which in fact guarantees refugees substantial socio-economic rights. 
Refugees are entitled access to primary education and basic health services granted to 
citizens.  Asylum seekers, however, have limited access to state services and may 
only access emergency medical treatment unless they are able to pay additional fees 
(their rights to services are the same as other non-nationals)60.   
                                                          
59 Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004  
60 L Landau (note 40) at 18  
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In terms of this Act, refugees are afforded basic freedom and security rights 
which include protection from the abuse of state power, such as wrongful arrest and 
detention.61 They are also afforded basic human dignity rights62 (protection against 
discrimination, family unity, freedom of movement and association, and freedom of 
religion) and self-sufficiency rights63 such as the right to work and study.  
 
 In terms of s 27 (a-b) of the Refugees Act a refugee is entitled to a formal 
recognition of refugee status in the prescribed form and enjoys full legal protection, 
which includes the rights set out in the in chapter 2 of the Constitution. This of course 
affords refugees a substantial amount of rights as the rights contained in chapter 2 of 
the Constitution (the Bill of Rights) are quite extensive64 and in fact guarantee more 
than the Conventions and the Covenants65.  
 
S 36 of the Constitution does allow for the limitation of these rights however, 
but only to the extent that the limitation is (i) reasonable; and (ii) justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and that such limitation does 
not negate the essential content of the right in question66. Refugees are also entitled in 
terms of this Act to an identity document67, to a South African travel document on 
application as contemplated in s 31.  They also have the right to apply for permanent 
residence after continued residence of five years and proof that they will remain a 
refugee indefinitely68.  In turn refugees and asylum seekers are obliged to abide by the 
laws of the Republic.69
 
                                                          
61 S 29 of the Refuges Act 130 of 1998 
62 S 27 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 and reg 15 of the Regulations of the Act 
63 Regulation 15 (1) (f) and (g) have the Regulations that state that a refugee is entitled to seek 
employment and the same basic primary education as the inhabitants of the Republic. 
64 These rights are: the right: to equality; to life; to freedom and dignity of the person; not to be subject 
to servitude and forced labour; to privacy; to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and 
opinion; to freedom of expression; to freedom of assembly; demonstration and petition; to freedom of 
association; freedom of movement; freedom of residence; of access to court; of access to information; 
to administrative justice; to engage in economic activity; to fair labour practices; to acquire and holds 
rights in property; to a healthy environment; to language and culture; and to education. There are also 
special children’s rights and rights for persons detained, arrested and accused. 
65 Certainly refugees in South Africa enjoy important rights that are not universally enjoyed in the 
African context, the most prominent being the right to seek employment and right to move freely 
within the country. 
66  VLA de la Hunt, ‘Refugees and the Law in South Africa,’ p.14 
67 S 30 0f the Refugees Act 
68 s 27 ( c) and regulation 15 (1) (d) 
69 Section 34 of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 
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As has already been mentioned the practical realisation of this essentially 
rights regarding refugee protection system has been fraught with difficulties and these 
obstacles and reality of the actual situation of refugees on the ground will be 
canvassed in the following section. It is this reality that is so far removed from the one 
envisaged in the Act that lays the foundation for the argument on the inclusion of 
refugees in the social security scheme, just as one of the core minimum standards that 
the government has to observe to practically realise the essence of the right regarding 
protection system that it has established and one that is constitutionally sound.  
 
As will become apparent in the following section, one of only ways that South 
Africa will be able to preserve a semblance of a respectable refuge protection system 
that is close to the one they envisaged, is by allowing refugees to be able to get social 
security benefits in light of the harsh realities of their life when they fail to 
successfully integrate. This is especially in light of the fact that the refugee protection 
regime is supposed to guarantee refugees access to safety, security and particularly 
the ability to recreate the normalcy and fulsomeness of a human life to the greatest 
degree possible in their countries of refuge or asylum which is not the case for the 
extremely vulnerable refugees who are not afforded access social security rights and 
relief. 
 
2.4 The implementation of refugee rights in South Africa 
 
Despite a commitment to universal rights and the promises of 
cosmopolitanism embedded in law and policy pronouncements, refugees, asylum 
seekers, and other (primarily black) immigrants tend to feel unprotected and 
unwelcome in South Africa.70  Although such responses are in part due to failed 
unrealistic or unrealised expectations, there is strong evidence that non-nationals 
living in the country suffer from systematic discrimination, social exclusion, and 
political alienation.71  The following paragraphs outline a general overview of their 
experiences and challenges.  
 
                                                          
70 This is observed by Landau LB in his paper ‘Xenophobia in South Africa and Problems Related To 
It’  which was presented for the Xenophobia hearings that were held by the Human Rights Commission 
and the Department of Foreign Affairs 2004 
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2.4.1 Employment and livelihoods 
South Africa is to be commended for having such superior rights such as the right to 
seek employment, because most countries in the developing world wary not to 
undermine development objectives and scarce economic opportunities for nationals 
do not include such rights in their refugee protection systems72.  Although refugees 
are entitled to seek employment, however, this has proved difficult for most of them.  
 
This is despite the fact that many of them have had specialised training and 
entrepreneurial experience and that they are generally better educated than South 
Africans73. They face huge obstacles in trying to integrate into the South African 
labour market place. Social conditions such as lack of employment opportunities74, 
racial barriers and bureaucratic obstacles inhibit refugees from realising their right to 
seek employment75. 
 
 In addition to xenophobia,76 obstacles to refugee participation in the labour 
market include language difficulties, educational difficulties and cultural barriers and 
furthermore no active mechanisms have been put in place to enable them to be able to 
access the labour market in light of these specific limitations and vulnerabilities. In a 
country where unemployment touches 40 % of the economically active population, 
refugees and asylum seeker workers compete for an ever shrinking pie of jobs in both 
the formal and informal sector.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
71 ibid. 
72 J Hathaway & J Dent Refugee Rights: Report on a Comparative Survey 1995  
73 F Belvedere, et al. National Refugee Baseline Survey: Final Report. Johannesburg: Community 
Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), Japan International Cooperation, and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 2003 
74 This is according to Landau who states that ‘unemployment is high nationally and it is estimated at 
between 40% and 50% in ‘Xenophobia in South Africa and Problems Related To It’ 
75 J Hathaway & J Dent (note 79) who also observe that bureaucratic obstacles are often particularly 
daunting with respect to the liberal profession. Many countries, including South Africa, unfortunately, 
take an unduly narrow approach to the recognition of the validity of foreign qualifications, which 
severely limit the access of refugees to the liberal professions. And because documents and 
qualifications from their home countries are not readily recognised in South Africa—or because those 
documents were destroyed or left due to war—many are working far below their qualifications or are 
unable to find suitable employment.  The need for refugees to undertake additional training in South 
Africa in order for them to have their qualifications recognised levies additional expenses and serves as 
a further hurdle to employment 
76 There are many instances in which South African employers and organisations have sought to 
systematically exclude foreigners from given professions or from working in particular areas. On 
October 23, 1997, for example, approximately 500 street-traders marched through Johannesburg’s 
streets chanting slogans demanding a boycott on foreigners’ goods and the deportation of foreigners 
(Palmary, et al, 2002: 112) in Landau “Xenophobia in South Africa and Problems Related To It’ 
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In fact a lot of other factors also militate against the meaningful exercise of 
this right in practice. The first is the time frames within which refugees are able to 
successfully get their refugee status documents and asylum seeker permits. The 
breakdown or inefficiency in the asylum determination process which was 
theoretically supposed to take a minimum of about 45 days and a maximum of 180 
days to adjudicate an asylum application to its finality now takes even up to two 
years, five or seven years for a genuine refugee to be officially recognised and given 
refugee status and sometimes anything between six to eight months for an asylum 
seeker to get an asylum seeker permit which is renewable every three months.  
 
Even for recognised refugees, who have permits which are valid for only two 
years, this still makes employers wary and disinclined to employ them77 as they view 
them as insecure and as being able to only engage in work of a temporary nature and 
which most employers may find undesirable. Many employers simply do not 
recognise refugees and asylum seekers’ identity papers or are unwilling to hire them 
out of the belief that they do not have rights to work in South Africa. This of course 
points to the insufficiency or the non-existence of a public awareness campaign by the 
government to promote refugees as a legal population in South Africa to facilitate 
their inclusion. 
 
Furthermore the fact that the Section 22 asylum seeker permit can be easily 
forged and/or damaged (it is a single piece of paper, often with hand written 
amendments) only further justifies such sentiments78. This is also because of a lack of 
a strategic public awareness campaign on the part of the government to promote 
awareness of refugees and their rights to the community at large, which is a necessary 
precondition for the successful recognition of refuge permits and rights by the local 
community in a country where local integration sans material assistance is deemed to 
be the best solution.  
 
                                                          
77 Potential employers are unwilling to take on and train someone who appears to have only temporary 
status. 
78 Landau op cit 
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Moreover many formal employers require a bank account into which they will 
pay weekly or monthly wages.  Because refugees do not have permanent residency 
and are typically unable to access banking services due to lack of documentation such 
as identity documents which they are entitled to as of right, effectively denies them 
opportunities for employment.  
 
To add further to the lack of employment burden of refugees, getting their 
permits renewed is a ‘nightmare’ for them as this can take almost as long as the initial 
time of anything up to two years while they get three months extensions on their 
expired permits, which makes their already unstable bargaining position even more 
precarious. These long delays mean that refugees have to constantly go and renew 
them, which in turn hamper their job hunting activities or their reliability as 
employees and thus cost them employment opportunities and earnings in terms of 
time.  
 
In fact because of a lack of understanding or appreciation of the special and 
unique situation that refugees are in, there are some sectors of the labour market that 
actually seek to exclude refugees. A case in point is the recent Security legislation79 
which seeks to regulate the service provision of the security industry, which has 
effectively excluded refugees from its ambit as it requires a security service provider 
to either be a citizen or a permanent resident amongst other things.  
 
This has adversely affected the refugee community as this was one of the most 
accessible niches of the labour market for them80.  This is also the case with certain 
by-laws81 created by the city of Cape Town pertaining to persons rendering parking or 
related services. These regulations have been designed in such a way as to ‘protect’ 
the local labour market and to effectively exclude refugees from their ambit or at the 
most to make it difficult for them to be able to render such services.  
 
  
                                                          
79 The Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001 
80 Traditionally, many refugees have found employment in the security sector. 
81 ‘Proposed by-law for the Promotion of a Safe and Secure Urban environment,’ by the Special Safety 
Portfolio Committee  
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While it is of course laudable to try and protect one’s local labour force82, 
policy makers cannot forget the obligations that South African has undertaken with 
regards to the protection of refugees, and so, policies designed to protect the local 
labour force should have the interests and rights of refugees incorporated within them. 
This is also important in light of their right to equal protection and treatment before 
the law which is guaranteed in the Constitution. 
 
This is important because policy makers should not only be aware but must in 
fact act on these obligations to protect refugees and protection in this case means 
access to basic human rights. A large number of the refugee community rely on 
parking and related services to sustain their families and these by-laws exclude the 
majority of refugees from doing the informal work that they have been doing for 
almost a decade.  This is usually one of the only means available to them of gaining 
any form of employment and revenue to support themselves as there is great 
exclusivity in so many of the professions in South Africa already.  
 
‘Patterns of exclusion are also evident in private sector industries where one 
would expect to see the profit motive trump discriminatory tendencies’83.  An 
important point to recognise is that while many South Africans can rely on extensive 
family networks to support them in times of financial hardship; such resources are not 
typically available to recently arrived asylum seekers84 and refugees making the need 
for them to benefit from the social security scheme all the more pertinent, as a mere 
minimum standard.  
 
2.4.2 Accommodation85
The majority of refugees have to stay in places for which they pay rent.  Belvedere, et 
al, suggests that about two fifths of asylum seekers and refugees rent a room in a 
                                                          
82 While protection of the national labour market has always been a priority of states, especially those 
in Africa as they face challenging economic circumstances, with high unemployment rates, and 
growing economies where labour opportunities are few, one must remember that South Africa 
willingly entered into these obligations and that there is therefore a price to pay if it serious about its 
commitment to safeguarding the socio-economic rights of refugees who area disempowered and 
disenfranchised  group whose rights, dignity and security needs need to be protected. This is becomes 
even more pertinent in a country like South Africa which has implemented the system of local 
integration as opposed to the closed camp system. 
83 ibid 
84 Landau op cit 
85 This introductory section is taken directly from Landau op cit 
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house or flat, or a back room or a cottage.  Just over one third of applicants rent a 
room, but share it with other individuals.  About 30% pay between R250 and R500 
per month for rent.  Importantly, because of immigrants’ vulnerabilities, their lack of 
contracts, and their need for flexibility, many immigrants pay more for 
accommodation than South Africans.  
 
 In the Wits University survey in Johannesburg, for example, 59% of non-
South Africans paid more than R800/month for accommodation compared to 37% of 
South Africans86. Due to their lower earnings, accommodation often represents a far 
greater proportion of expenditures for immigrants’ than South Africans.  
 
It should also be recognised that because of immigrants’ limited funds and the 
need to accommodate non-working relatives, overcrowding is a significant problem.  
In Belvedere, et al’s study, respondents typically stayed in places with three rooms 
(excluding kitchen and bathroom), but with seven people, meaning that two or three 
people were sharing each room.  
 
 It is not uncommon for refugees to have close to ten people sharing a room, 
often requiring that they sleep in shifts and make use of bathrooms or hallways.  The 
partitioning of flats and houses into smaller units has potentially negative effects on 
the health, security, and economic productivity of the residents.  It also has the 
potential to degrade the country’s built environment87.  
 
2.4.3 Identity documents, financial services, and travel documents 
 
Despite being entitled to identity documents and travel documents refugees 
face serious hardship in trying to obtain these88.  Many refugees in Cape Town for 
example have long outstanding applications for refugee identity documents. The 
inability to get identity documents has been particularly devastating for refugees as it 
is almost impossible to gain access to economic and social services in an identity 
document driven society such as South Africa.  Without an I.D. refugees are un able 




to open bank accounts, they have difficulty entering into leases and credit 
agreements89, they are denied access to benefits to which they are entitled to, just to 
highlight a few of the numerous problems that refugees have because of this.  
 
With regard to travel documents, a refugee is only entitled to a travel 
document if he or she has an identity document. Given the delay in the issuing of 
identity documents there has been a corresponding delay in the issuing of travel 
documents.  To compound the issue the issue the department of home affairs does not 
issue emergency travel documents, which prejudice any travelling plans that a refugee 
might have or any business trips that might need to make and makes a mockery of 
their freedom of movement. 
 
 Refugees face further difficulties in that they are unable to access the basic 
child care grants90, or disability grants as they are not entitled to any social grants as 
these are only for citizens and now also for permanent residents.  This is despite their 
right to public assistance in terms of the 1951 Convention and their right to social 
assistance in terms of both the Constitution and the Refugees Act.  
 
The argument that this paper advances and the reason why the plight of 
refugees has been highlighted in such detail is that in light of these problems that 
refugees face in trying to integrate and the consequent poverty and degrading 
circumstances that many of them are then forced to live under because of this, is to 
show why there exists this critical need for the establishment of some sort of 
minimum standards of treatment, especially for vulnerable groups that are legally 
protected.  
 
This is because refugees experience the same hardships as those South African 
citizens covered by the social assistance legislation and therefore if their right to equal 
treatment before the law, non-discrimination and human dignity is of any essence and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
88 This is because the Department was apparently having technical problems with the software used in 
issuing these documents and has thus been unable to issue them out.  
89 VLA de la Hunt, in ‘Tracking Progress: Initial Experiences with the Refugees Act, 130 of 1998’. 
90 In fact should a child be placed with refugee foster parents, they will not be able to access the foster 
care grant. This position might be changing however following a successful legal challenge by three 
refugee foster parents in the Pretoria court very recently.  
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meaning their exclusion not only exacerbates their integration problems but is also 
unconstitutional and militates against the achievement of these rights and values.  
 
 The following section on the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence examines 
the legal standards that have been articulated by the court as being acceptable in a 
South African society founded on the values of human dignity and equality, on which 
these minimum standards can be established.  Another reason for choosing to look at 
the constitutionality of this exclusion is because of the belief that the constitutional 
principles and rights found in the Constitution must be utilised to provide for the 
protection of all vulnerable and marginalised groups in the South African society91 
and thus when one is looking at emerging standards of protection, Constitutional 
declarations are the most obvious place to find them.  
 
As Liebenberg observes, ‘the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill of 
Rights contributes to a substantive view of a transformed South African society. They 
establish positive duties on the State to ensure that everyone has access to the various 
socio-economic goods and services enshrined provision.92 The hope is that through 
this analysis of the standards articulated by the court, broad standards can be 
established through which one can theorise the practical realisation of refugee rights 
and the improvement of refugee protection in a Constitutional democracy.  
 
The Constitutional Court has been defining a certain standard that the 
government has to meet in relation to the realisation of the socio-economic rights of 
nationals. With regards to monitoring how well or how effectively South Africa is 
actually implementing its obligations towards refugees these standards developed by 
the court enable us to develop a core minimum standard by which the government can 
be held accountable for their implementation.  
 
The Constitutional court has clearly refused to buy into the state’s argument of 
resource incapacity and stated that there are certain minimum core standards that have 
to be met and realised immediately93 and this same standard has to be employed in 
                                                          
91 The idea of using the law as a weapon to fight injustice as is done by human rights lawyers.  
92 Liebenberg, L ‘The value of human dignity when interpreting socio-economic rights’, 
93 This will become apparent from the Constitutional court judgements examined below 
 30
holding government accountable and in assessing how successful they are in 
achieving the effective protection and successful social integration as expressed in s27 
of the Refugees Act. 
 
For example until recently, asylum seekers were not allowed to work or study 
until they were granted refugee status.  Such restrictions presented significant 
problems considering the long duration of status determination and the lack of 
financial assistance.  In such instances, almost any act conducted to ensure applicants’ 
survival, working or studying was criminalised.  The courts had to articulate the 
minimum standards of protection that were acceptable in this regard. These standards, 
discussed next, are illustrative of the high standard of human rights protection that the 
Constitution demands.  
 
The 2003 case of Watchenuka v. Minister of Home Affairs challenged these 
provisions.94 The judge in that case noted that:  
Human dignity has no nationality. It is inherent in all people citizens and non-citizens 
alike, simply because they are human. And while that person happens to be in this 
country- for whatever reason- it must be respected, and is protected, by Section 10 of 
the Bill of Rights. The inherent dignity of all people, like human life itself, is one of the 
foundational values of the Bill of Rights. It constitutes the basis and the inspiration 
for the recognition that is given to other more specific protections that are afforded by 
the Bill of Right95.  
 
Chaskalson et al in Constitutional Law of South Africa96 quotes with approval 
the following dictum in respect to the importance of having a job and the effect, 
which it has on a person’s dignity.   
Work is one of the fundamental aspects of a person’s life…. An essential 
component of his or her sense of dignity, self worth and emotional well-
being….highly significant in shaping the….psychological, emotional and 
physical elements of a person’s dignity and self respect.  
 
 
                                                          
94 Watchenuka and Another v. Minister of Home Affairs 2003 (1) SA 619 (C) 
95 In the judgement, the court held that the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs and not the 
Minister of Home Affairs was responsible to determine the conditions relating to study or work under 
which an asylum seeker permit may be issued. In April 2004, the Standing Committee on Refugee 
Affairs took the decision to remove the prohibition against work and study for asylum seekers as a 
result of lobbying efforts by civil society. Asylum seekers are now entitled to seek employment and 
engage in study for the duration of their asylum seeker status in Landau in his paper titled, 
‘Xenophobia in South Africa and Problems related to it.’ 
96 Review Service 2 1998 at 30 
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And he further stated in S v Makwanyane that97, 
 The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and 
the source of all other personal rights in chapter 3. By committing ourselves to a 
society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these two 
rights above all others. 
 
  If one uses the above standard it is clear that the nature of the obligation on 
the South Africa government with regard to refugee protection is an extensive one 
indeed and that the exclusion of refugees from access to social security falls short of 
these standards. As stated above the paper aims primarily to focus on the way in 
which the South African Constitutional Court has defined the nature of the obligations 
that are imposed on the government by the Constitutional clauses guaranteeing the 
socio-economic rights of the South African people.  
The idea is to look at the standards that the Constitutional Court is setting for 
the realisation of South African national’s rights and to use this to develop justiciable 
standards for evaluating refugee protection and as a guiding framework on how the 
rights of refugees as set out in the Refugees Act can be rationalized and implemented 
to ensure that core minimum standards can be observed. 
South Africa has embarked on an ambitious project of achieving a 
Constitutional democracy and the ideals and principles under girding this vision have 
influenced the manner in which the Refugees Act was formulated and the way in 
which the protection regime was defined. Remarkable strides have been made in the 
past ten years in transforming the legal foundations of the South African state. Now 
the challenge for South Africa is to deliver resources and services to all people, and 
particularly its vulnerable populations, in a manner that demonstrates its commitment 
to these new priorities.  
A comprehensive and integrated system of social protection is critical to the 
achievement of this objective. This is the yardstick against which the Social 
Assistance Act must be assessed. In this context, grave concerns about the capacity of 
the Act to improve substantially the current social safety net and generate tangible 
prospects of a better life for all people in South Africa, especially the most 
                                                          
97 In S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 144 
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disadvantaged have to be noted98. The primary reservations centre on the lack of an 
overarching policy framework for the realisation of the constitutional right of 
universal access to social security and, consequently, a clear role for social assistance 
programmes within that larger vision and the unconstitutional exclusion of certain 
categories of people such as refugees from access to social assistance99.  
 
There is therefore a need for an effective policy framework premised on the 
principles articulated above by Chaskalson. The 1997 White Paper on Social Welfare 
represented the first major attempt by a democratic South African government to 
sketch the contours of a comprehensive, integrated and equitable developmental 
social welfare programme for South Africa. Foremost amongst the goals of this new 
national strategy was: "To facilitate the provision of appropriate developmental social 
welfare services to all South Africans, especially those living in poverty, those who 
are vulnerable and those who have special needs”100.  
 
Echoing the language of section 27(1) (c) of the Constitution, the White Paper 
promised: "The Government will take steps to ensure the progressive achievement of 
social security for all including appropriate social assistance for those unable to 
support themselves and their dependents. ... Policies and programmes will be 
developed to ensure that every member of society can realise his or her dignity, safety 
and creativity”.  
The idea of respect for a person’s dignity is echoed here once again showing 
its principle place in the argument for the extension of social security to extremely 
vulnerable groups. Every member of society101 who finds him or herself in need of 
care is supposed to have access to support. Social welfare policies and legislation will 
facilitate universal access to social welfare services and social security benefits in an 
enabling environment.102 This policy objective is clearly not being achieved by the 
                                                          
98 (note 1) above 
99 ibid 
100 The White Paper on Social Welfare of 1997 Chapter 2, para 7 
101 My emphasis  
102 ( note 14) above at Chapter 2, paras 8 and 26  
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exclusion of vulnerable refugees from its potential benefits. With regard to social 
security policy in particular, the White Paper highlighted the importance of social 
grants in alleviating poverty103 and recognised the importance of the observance of 
acceptable minimum standards. 
The White Paper remains the only comprehensive statement of social 
protection policy guiding the development of a legislative agenda. Apart from the lack 
of a coherent policy framework within which to situate the Act, it has other serious 
deficiencies. Paramount is its manifest failure to satisfy the Constitutional obligation 
to provide access to social security for all who are unable to support themselves and 
their dependants. It fails on two counts. First, it makes no attempt to extend access to 
social assistance to the nearly 12 million poor people who currently live in households 
with no access to social assistance104.  
Second, it arbitrarily excludes non-citizens from social assistance, except in 
cases where the South African government has signed an agreement with the person's 
home nation. This is inconsistent with section 27(1) of the Constitution, which 
stipulates that "everyone" has the right of access to social security, including 
appropriate social assistance.  
To avoid a constitutional challenge, and to make it compatible with 
constitutionally defined minimum standards, the Act's objects, listed in section 3, 
should include: (a) promote the progressive realisation of the right of access to 
appropriate social assistance for all who are unable to support themselves and their 
dependents105. In addition, the eligibility of refugees and asylum seekers and their 
dependants and undocumented children should be recognised through an amendment 
to section 5(1) (c). 
                                                          
103 At Chapter 7 paras 26 and 27 it states, ‘The Government is committed to the provision of a 
comprehensive national social security system and the Government's Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution strategy recognises the importance of a broad social security net comprising social 
payments and targeted welfare services. ... There will be universal access to an integrated and 
sustainable social security system. Every South African should have a minimum income, sufficient to 
meet basic subsistence needs, and should not have to live below minimum acceptable standards.’  




Chapter Three:  Defining a South African Constitutional 
Standard for Refugee Rights 
 
3.1 The Realisation of Socio-Economic Rights  
 
The South African Constitution is one of the most progressive Constitutions in 
the world and one of the few in which socio-economic rights are expressly set out in 
the Bill of rights and which have been determined to be jusiticiable. As one 
commentator said, ‘In short, the inclusion of economic and social rights has 
dramatically changed the centre of gravity of the Bill of Rights’.106 This means that 
the South African Constitution is a document with great potential to contribute 
towards greater social justice, including the internationally recognised standards of 
treatment necessary for effective human rights (refugee) protection in a country once 
known for its violation of almost every internationally recognised human right107.  
 
The aim of this section is to see therefore how refugee protection principles 
can be realised in such a context, what minimum standards can be preserved and 
therefore to show the way forward in terms of preserving the protection regime with 
regard to socio-economic rights.  As Harrell-Bond observes,  
it is assumed that the way refugees are treated by a particular society is a 
yardstick by which the observance of human rights generally can be measured 
and that efforts to improve respect for refugees’ rights can be an entry point 
for improving the human rights situation for the population as a whole.108  
 
The point can therefore be made that any investment in promoting the rights of 
refugees is an investment in a more just society. This analysis will be done by looking 
at the Constitutional Court judgments that outline the obligations of the South African 
                                                          
106 Yacoob J in the Grootboom Case 
107 Christof Heyns ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa’ ESR Review Vol.1 No.1 1998 
108 B Harell-Bond ‘Towards the Economic and Social ‘Integration’ of refugee populations in Host 
Countries in Africa,’ This document was prepared as a stimulus for discussion at the Stanley 
Foundation conference “Refugee Protection in Africa: How to Ensure Security and Development for 
Refugees and Hosts” held in Entebbe, Uganda from November 10-14, 2002 
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government with regards to socio-economic rights of its nationals in general109 and 
those of non-nationals. The idea is that these Constitutional pronouncements are 
setting recognisable standards of treatment from which one can start defining 
standards of protection for refugees.   
 
3.2 History and Nature of Socio-Economic Rights 
 
Seeing that this paper seeks to extrapolate minimum standards of treatment 
from the Constitutional Court’s articulation of the obligations imposed upon 
government by the constitutional socio-economic entitlements it is necessary to look 
at the history and controversy that surrounds the justiciability of these rights before an 
analysis of the constitutional imperative is undertaken for the sake of completeness 
and also as a means of centering the issue in its broader historical and jurisprudential 
context.  
 
Although economic, social and cultural rights have been incorporated into the 
South African Constitution, they are surrounded by controversies both of an 
ideological and technical nature110. While civil and political rights are generally 
accepted as justiciable, there continues to be debate around the justiciability of 
economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
The differences between these rights are sometimes suggested to revolve 
around the role of the State. Thus civil and political rights are often seen as requiring 
only passive duties of abstention from the State, whereas economic, social and 
cultural rights require active measures111. This distinction however is specious as most 
rights call for active measures from the State like the provision of courts and court 
officials to give effect to the right to a fair trial for example112. 
 
                                                          
109 As one commentator observed, ‘The standards that a state must adhere to with respect to the 
realisation of any of its obligations is most developed and exquisitely set out in the manner in which it 
treats its own nationals.’  
110 Allison Tilley ‘Are Non-Nationals entitled to Socio-Economic Rights?’ ESR Review Vol 1, No. 3 
1998 
111 K O’Regan ‘Introducing Socio-Economic Rights’ ESR Review Vol 1 No 4, March 99
112 ibid 
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There are two main schools of thought that inform the debates surrounding the 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. One is the polycentric debate and the 
other is the democracy and separation of powers debate113. The polycentric debate 
argues that because the realisation of socio-economic rights has budgetary and policy 
implications it is therefore not the court’s realm to decide upon them and there this is 
seen as something that the elected legislature should legislate on for execution by an 
accountable executive114.  
 
The issue becomes even more pronounced and hotly contested if the budgetary 
implications are in favour of non-nationals of course. This is where the recognition of 
the fact that refugees are a legally protected sub-population group whose rights are 
derived from a vital and internationally agreed human rights system, which entitles 
them to claim the benefit of a deliberate and coherent system of rights115 becomes 
necessary.  Cognizance is taken of the fact that it is a sensitive issue however that 
needs to be managed carefully in conjunction with public education and awareness of 
refugee rights and rational of the protection system.  
 
The separation of powers argument says that because socio-economic rights 
require expenditure by government in order to meet tertiary level obligations it is a 
matter for parliament and should not be subject to enforcement by the courts116. It 
argues further that prioritising rights is more appropriately undertaken by an elected 
legislature than the judiciary which is the arm of government primarily responsible for 
budgetary decisions117.  
 
Another argument that has been made is that socio-economic rights are vague 
and imprecise. Herman Schwartz has noted that, ‘Constitutional rights are usually 
written in general terms and we depend on courts to give them specific substance’118. 
This is therefore why it is necessary and essential to look at the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court as the emerging standard by which government can be held 
accountable and by which we can begin to measure “effective protection” as it were.  
                                                          
113 (note 110) above 
114 ibid 
115 J Hathaway The Rights of Refugees Under International Law 2005 at p4 




When it comes to constitutional litigation of socio-economic rights, state 
officials are required to place evidence before the court of their policy regarding the 
rationing of scarce resources and their budgets.119 These are fundamental 
considerations with regards to the protection regime established in a particular 
country. This is because these are the factors that will contribute to how generous and 
refugee centered it will be. This question of availability of resources and budgetary 
concerns is a crucial consideration especially in the African context of scarce 
resources, extreme poverty and underdevelopment.  It will be interesting to see how 
this limitation can lose its centrality when faced by a fundamental right to dignity 
that’s almost non-derogable, as it is the South African constitutional context. 
 
Bongani Majola states that one of the envisaged effects of the Constitution is 
the transformation of South African society to a democratic society characterised by 
freedom and equality120. This, I believe is the principle that should underlie the 
perception, interpretation and implementation of refugee legislation and protection 
system in South Africa. In this regard Okoth-Obbo says, quite rightly in my opinion, 
that, ‘everywhere the world over, an irrefutable purpose should lie at the heart of the 
laws, policies and practices established to govern refugees, that is the system of 
international protection.’ 121    
 
In South Africa the transformative nature of the bill of rights which is based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom is an important foundation for analysing the 
ability and extent of the nature of refugee protection that South Africa aimed to create 
and can implement. It is unique in the manner in which it seeks to bring about the 
transformation of the South African society, not only in terms of civil and political 
rights but also in terms of socio-economic entitlements. 
 
 These rights were obviously meant to be achieved without discrimination and 
with due regard to the principles of equality and human dignity as envisaged in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
118 H Schwartz ‘Economic and Social Rights’  American University Journal of International Law and 
Policy 551 at 562  
119 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (1997) 
120 B Majola ‘A Response to Craig Scott, A South African Perspective’ ESR Review Vol 1 No 4, 1999 
121G Okoth-Obbo ‘Does Refugee Protection in Africa Need mediation?’ p1 
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preamble of the Constitution and its core principles.  While many Constitutions place 
emphasis only on civil and political rights the South African Constitution goes a step 
further and attempts to transform the social and economic dimensions of the lives of 
South Africans through the entrenchment of socio-economic rights.  
 
It is quite obvious from the above that the Bill of Rights is the blue print on 
which the framers of the Constitution and the country as a whole hope to rebuild 
South African Society. Thus refugee protection as a phenomenon of that landscape 
has to be understood and interpreted in this light. It thus becomes necessary to 
examine the pronouncements by the ‘Court’ on obligations imposed upon the state by 
socio-economic rights. This is what should guide our understanding of the nature of 
refugee protection that South Africa hoped to establish and can implement if it carries 
on developing its refugee policies based on Constitutional principles in the spirit 
within which they have been interpreted.   
 
It must be noted that the Constitutional Court122 has held that the issue of 
whether socio-economic rights are justiciable at all in South Africa was put beyond 
question by the text of the Constitution as construed in the judgment Ex parte 
Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the  Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa123 when it stated that 
Socio-economic rights are expressly included in the Bill of Rights; they cannot 
be said to exist on paper only. Section 7(2) of the  Constitution requires the 
State 'to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights' 
and the courts are constitutionally bound to ensure that they are protected and 
fulfilled. 
 
Obviously economic realities will dictate and are in fact determining the 
interpretation and implementation thus far. This is not a difficult concept to grasp and 
in fact one sympathises with a country like South Africa which is a fairly prosperous 
middle income country albeit one with great disparities of wealth and one which 
stands alone as a beacon of hope for the masses of Africa who are affected by 
protracted conflicts and endemic poverty.  
 
                                                          
122 This was in the Grootboom case discussed below at p49 
123 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (1996 (10) BCLR 1253) 
 39
One can understand the reluctance to fully implement or rather their inability 
to give full effect to intended objectives of these rights. Notwithstanding this however 
there are certain legal measures or core minimum obligations that must be fulfilled in 
matters where human dignity is of the essence. Thus it is important to clarify what 
these standards are that have been created and that can guide and be used as a 
benchmark for government’s implementation of the local integration initiative.   
 
It is significant to note that the first binding international instrument 
guaranteeing protection of certain social and economic rights was the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.   Although some of the guarantees discriminate between nationals and 
non-nationals, and may be seen to have been superceded by provisions contained in 
subsequent instruments, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR), it is informative that the drafters of the 1951 
Refugee Convention clearly viewed social and economic rights as being essential for 
meaningful protection of refugees124.   
 
 
3.3 Constitutional Pronouncements  
 
The Constitutional Court has looked at a number of issues that are relevant to 
the argument that this paper advances. It has looked at the role and centrality of the 
principles of human dignity, equality and non-discrimination, which are crucial for 
our purpose as there are critical in the determination of minimum standards of 
treatment.  It is these fundamental rights and core values that are infringed by the 
exclusion of refugees from the social security scheme and from any government 
funded material assistance. It has also set out the principles which guide it in the 
interpretation and in the realisation of socio-economic rights as they are framed in the 
Constitution. This section firstly looks at the court’s position on the centrality of these 
principles and then looks at the Court’s pronouncements with regard to socio-
economic rights proper in the section that follows. 
 
                                                          
124 (note 3) above 
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The analysis of the core values will address the following points;125
 
3.3.1    The rights of refugees in South Africa 
 
3.3.2 Unfair discrimination and impairment of dignity 
 
3.3.3 Stages of enquiry in a case where the right to equality, non-discrimination and 
dignity are involved 
 
3.3.4 Applying the stages of enquiry to the matter at hand 
 
3.3.5 Limitation analysis 
 
3.3.1 The rights of refugees in South Africa 
 
The rights that refugees in South Africa have to equality, non-discrimination 
and dignity are largely contained in the provisions of the Constitution and the 
Refugees Act. Section 9 of the Constitution provides: 
“Equality” 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has he right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law. 
 
 
(2) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth. 
 
(3) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National 
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair 
discrimination. 
 
(4) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) 
is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
 
Section 10 of the Constitution provides that: 
“Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected 
and protected”  
 
                                                          
125 Most of the elements of this analysis are taken from the heads of argument drafted for the SIRA 
case being prosecuted by Lawyers for Human rights together with the UCT Legal Aid Clinic. 
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And s 27 (b) of the Refugees Act, 130 of 1998 entitles refugees to full legal protection 
of the fundamental rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
 
Equality, non discrimination and dignity are without doubt core values of the 
Constitution and also the ideal of a democratic and open society, to which all persons 
and state organs in South Africa are duty bound, and ones which they are to strive to 
realise through all their actions. This principle resonates throughout the 
Constitution126. The Constitutional Court has repeatedly confirmed and emphasized 
the importance of equality and dignity and the achievement of these principles in 
South Africa.  
 
Goldstone J in President of the Republic of South Africa and another v. 
Hugo127 stated the following, which finds application to the argument advanced 
herein,  
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies recognition that the 
purpose of our new Constitutional and democratic order is the establishment 
of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and 
respect regardless of their membership of particular groups. The achievement 
of such a society in the context of our deeply in egalitarian past will not be 
easy, but that that is the goal of the Constitution should not be forgotten or 
overlooked.128
  
It therefore stands without a doubt, from the above and the wording used in 
the provisions of the Constitution and in the Constitutional case law, that a refugee 
who is resident within the borders of South Africa, has the right, not to be unfairly 
discriminated against by the State as is currently done by various pieces of legislation 
such as the Social Security legislation and also the Securities Industry Regulations. 
Extremely vulnerable refugees further have, without a doubt, the right in terms of the 
abovementioned provisions of the Refugees Act, the Constitution and the 
Constitutional case law to have their dignity which is impaired by this exclusion, 
respected and protected. 
 
                                                          
126 See amongst others Chapter 1-, sections 7 (1), 9, 10, 36 (1) and 39 (1) (a) of the Constitution 
127 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) at Para 41 
128 See also Hoffmann v. South African Airways 2001 (11) BCLR 1211      (CC) at Para 27 and 
Shabalala v. Attorney General, Transvaal 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC) at Para 26 
 42
The rights of refugees and all other persons resident in South Africa, not to be 
unfairly discriminated against and to have their dignity respected and protected by the 
State, arise not only from the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Constitution, but further 
arise from international obligation. As said previously South Africa is a ratifying 
party to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The 
right to social security and assistance is contained in two articles of the 1951 
Convention: article 23 (‘Public Relief’129), and article 24 (‘Labour Legislation and 
Social Security’).  In contrast to 1951 Convention provisions on the right to work, the 
right to social security and assistance is granted at the level of ‘national treatment’ to 
refugees who are ‘lawfully staying’ in the territory of a Contracting State. 
 
That South Africa has clear international obligations to eliminate any form of 
unfair discrimination, such as the one that exists in the exclusion of refugees from 
accessing social security has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Hoffmann 
v South African Airways at Para 51 as follows:  
“The need to eliminate unfair discrimination does not only arise from Chapter 
2 of our Constitution. It also arises from international obligation. South Africa 
has ratified a range of anti-discrimination Conventions including the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. In the preamble to the African 
Charter, member states undertake, amongst other things, to dismantle all 
forms of discrimination. Article 2 prohibits discrimination of any kind. In 
terms of Article 1, member states have an obligation to give effect to the rights 
and freedoms enshrined in the Charter, with a view to elimination of any 
discrimination’.130  
Thus the standard of protection must correspond with the concomitant obligations as 
outlined. 
 
3.3.2 Unfair Discrimination and Impairment of Dignity 
 
It is trite law to say that the right not to be unfairly discriminated against and 
the right to dignity are mutually supporting and interlinked. An unfair infringement on 
a person’s right to equality and non-discrimination usually leads to an infringement of 
                                                          
129 S 23 states that ‘The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their 
territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their 
nationals.’ Grahl-Madsen notes that the drafters were not concerned with how the assistance 
was to be delivered -- whether through national or communal funds or through separate agencies 
than those providing assistance to nationals -- but only that refugees receive the same material 
benefits as nationals. This is in J Dent supra 
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a person’s dignity. Ngcobo J has confirmed this in Hoffmann v. South African 
Airways at para 27 as follows: 
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination is the recognition that 
under our Constitution all human beings, regardless of their position in 
society, must be accorded equal dignity. That dignity is impaired when a 
person is unfairly discriminated against.131
 
The Constitutional Court has defined the meaning of the term unfair 
discrimination in Prinsloo v. Van der Linde and Another at Para 31 which reads as 
follows: 
 
Given the history of this country we are of the view that “discrimination” has 
acquired a particular pejorative meaning relating to the unequal treatment of 
people based on attributes and characteristics attaching to them. We are 
emerging from a period in our history during which the humanity of the 
majority of the inhabitants of this country was denied. They were treated as 
not having inherent worth: as objects whose identities could be arbitrarily 
defined by those in power rather than persons of infinite worth. In short they 
were denied their inherent dignity… In our view unfair 
discrimination...principally means treating persons differently in a way which 
impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal 
in dignity. 
 
Thus the government’s discrimination of refugees in terms of access to legislation that 
deals with critical social assistance or economic empowerment such as the securities 
regulations, based on their identity as non-nationals in a manner which impairs their 
fundamental dignity as vulnerable human beings who are already disadvantaged as 
recepience of international surrogate protection is unconstitutionally unfair and 
therefore an unacceptable standard of treatment.  
 
3.3.3 Stages of an Enquiry in a Case Involving the Right to Equality, Non-
Discrimination and Dignity 
 
The Constitutional Court has, on numerous occasions, set out the stages of 
enquiry into a case where the fundamental right of equality has come to the fore. It 
has also on numerous occasions confirmed that the following approach should also be 
followed under the 1996 Constitution: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
130 See also Hoffmann v South African Airways (Supra) at Para 51 footnote 43, for a list of the 
Conventions which South Africa has ratified prohibiting discrimination 
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It may be as well to tabulate the stages of enquiry which become necessary 
where an attack is made on a provision in reliance in section 8 of the Interim 
Constitution132. They are; 
 
(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If 
so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate 
governmental purpose? If it does not then there is a violation of section 
8(1). Section 9 (1) of the 1996 Constitution Even if it does bear a 
rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination. 
(b) Does the Differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a 
two stage analysis: 
(1) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to “discrimination”? If it is 
on a specified ground, then the discrimination will have been 
established. If it is not on a specified ground then whether or not 
there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the 
ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the 
potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human 
beings or to affect them adversely in a comparable serious manner. 
(2) If the differentiation amounts to discrimination, does it amount to 
“unfair discrimination”? If it has been found to have been on a 
specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed. If on an 
unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the 
complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact 
of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her 
situation. If at the end of this stage of enquiry, the differentiation is 
found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation of section 8 
(2) [Section 9 (3) of the 1996 Constitution]. 
(3) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will 
have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under 
the limitations clause (section 33 of the Interim Constitution) 
[Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution]133 
 
3.3.4 Application of the Stages of the Equality Enquiry to the exclusion of refugees 
from the social security scheme 
 
All the principles enumerated in the case law above find direct application to 
the issue being discussed in this paper. It is accordingly necessary to apply the 
equality enquiry test formulated and confirmed by the Constitutional Court, to this 
matter. As part of such enquiry it is necessary to determine whether s5 of the Act134 
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132This is set out in s 9 of the Constitution of 1996 
133 Satchwell v The President of the Republic of South Africa NO  Case no. CCT 45/ 01 at page 14 Para 
21 and also footnote 20 (Accessed: www.concourt.gov.za/
134 Social Assistance Act op cit 
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differentiates between persons and/or groups of persons in South Africa. When doing 
so it is clear that it does indeed differentiate between persons who may either be 
classified as South African citizens and now permanent residents on the one hand and 
on the other, those persons who are not citizens of or permanent residents in South 
Africa. 
 
A refugee is accordingly a person who is neither a South African citizen nor a 
permanent resident of South Africa and thus part of the group who is disadvantaged 
and excluded by the provisions of s5 of the Social Assistance Act. As the matter 
stands today the sole reason why the Department of Social development does not 
include refugees in the grants system is because of their not being a South African 
citizen, but a refugee135.  
 
Because refugee status is not one of the specified grounds mentioned in 
section 9 (3) of the Constitution on which discrimination is prohibited, the next step in 
the enquiry would be to determine whether differentiation on that ground would 
constitute discrimination for purpose of Constitutional interpretation. In Harksen v. 
Lane No and Others136 the Constitutional Court stated that to determine this, one 
would conduct an inquiry as to whether: 
...objectively viewed, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics 
which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons 
as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious 
manner.137
 
The fact that a person is a refugee is normally due to either an event or 
incident over which an individual has no control, such as war, or due to very personal 
characteristics or attributes that such a person holds, such as his or her nationality, 
race, ethnicity, religion or political opinion and which such person can neither change 
or if it is possible to change it, the personal cost of such change would be too high so 
as to make it unreasonable to require it of the refugee. It is thus submitted that refugee 
                                                          
135 This is implied from the arguments that they advanced in the Khosa/Mahlaule case on why 
permanent residence and other foreign nationals were excluded.  
136 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) at Para 53 
137 See Also Larbi-Odam v. MEC for Education (North West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) at Para  
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status is, as with citizenship is a very personal attribute that is extremely difficult to 
change and one which individuals has very little control over. 
 
Furthermore, refugees as a minority group in South Africa with no political 
power whatsoever are accordingly extremely vulnerable to abuse by the powers of the 
State or the whimsical decisions of politicians and/ or public officials or private 
persons. That this is indeed the case is clearly demonstrated by the facts canvassed 
above on the difficulties they encounter in South Africa. It is arguable therefore that 
the differentiation on the basis of refugee status does indeed constitute unfair 
discrimination which is prohibited for purpose of section 9 of the Constitution and as 
defined in the mentioned case law. This brings into focus the fact that the 
government’s exclusionary policies are not in keeping with constitutionally 
determined standards of treatment and thus need to be revised accordingly.    
 
The second leg of the equality enquiry dictates that it must be established, since 
the discrimination is on the basis of an unspecified ground, whether the discrimination 
is also “unfair”. Mokgoro J in Larbi-Odam v. MEC for Education (North West 
Province) at Para 23 has stated that the determining factor regarding the unfairness of 
discrimination to be: 
 ….the impact of the discrimination on the appellants, which in turn requires a 
consideration of the nature of the group affected, the nature of the power 
exercised and the nature of the interest involved.138
 
It has been held by the Constitutional Court, and applies to this matter also, that: 
The more vulnerable the group adversely affected by the discrimination, the 
more likely the discrimination will be held to be unfair. Similarly the more 
invasive the nature of the discrimination, the more likely it will be held to be 
unfair.139  
 
Clearly, Section 5 is the provision of an Act made by Parliament that contains 
a requirement for being able to be a beneficiary to a government poverty relief 
scheme. Without such access the extremely vulnerable refugee community is forced 
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to live in abject poverty. Thus the provisions of the Social Assistance Act, seriously 
affects their ability to become self-sufficient and to successfully integrate and 
consequently infringing their right not only to seek but also to enjoy asylum which is 
a vital interest, which South Africa promised to guarantee when they signed the 
Convention.   
 
Furthermore a reading and application of section 5 of the Social Assistance 
Act which prevents refugees from accessing much needed poverty relief, solely 
because they are refugees and not permanent residents of South Africa or South 
African citizen, can not only be classified as mere discrimination, but indeed as 
amounting to unfair discrimination. This is so because it amounts to an interpretation 
and application of a legislative provision that severely affect refugees’ ability to self-
sustain and to not live in abject poverty. This is especially in light of the fact that 
when most of them arrive in South Africa they are destitute and have virtually nothing 
with them that can help them start off in their host country. 
 
  It thus severely interferes with and affects their ability to create a livelihood 
for themselves. Further it infringes on their feeling of self worth and dignity and it 
detracts from South Africa’s international commitments. Refugees are among the 
most dispossessed and vulnerable groups in South Africa today, who need the South 
African government to provide some form of material or social assistance or 
otherwise.  
 
Refugees generally, are left to their own devices in providing for the social 
needs of themselves and of their families and without an opportunity of accessing 
some form of social relief, most of them are unable to live with dignity. This therefore 
impairs their fundamental dignity as human beings, who are inherently equal in 
dignity to South Africans and permanent residents. It therefore amounts to unfair 
discrimination for this reason. The Department of Social development should in terms 
of the South African Constitution, Refugees Act and above Constitutional case law, 
treat refugees no differently than South African citizens and permanent residents, 




3.3.5 Limitation Analysis 
If the conclusion that has been reached above that the Department’s exclusion 
of refugees solely because they are refugees and not permanent residents of South 
Africa or South African citizens indeed amounts to unfair discrimination, then next 
step of the equality analysis would be to determine whether such unfair discrimination 
is justifiable. The onus would be on the Department to show that such unfair 
discrimination was justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.140  
 
It is submitted that there can not be any justification given for such exclusion 
as it impairs their human dignity unnecessarily and fails to take into account the 
context of flight and the nature of the protection that should be rendered and its 
motivations. Refugee protection provides for special treatment because it takes into 
account the fact that when refugees flee from their home countries they have not 
prepared financially for their journey into refuge as is essential for other types of 
migrants. 
 
3.4 Pronouncements on the realisation of socio-economic rights 
 
This section will now examine the pronouncement of the Constitutional Court 
in two141 of the main cases involving socio-economic rights. These cases have 
profound human rights implications for vulnerable groups and non-nationals of which 
refugees and asylum seekers constitute a part. In the Grootboom 142case Yacoob J 
noted that because of the way in which the Constitution is drafted it showed that ‘the 
people of South Africa are committed to the attainment of social justice and the 
improvement of the quality of life  for everyone. The preamble to our Constitution 
records this commitment’143. 
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He noted that the Constitution declares the founding values of our society to 
be 'human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms'144. This case grappled with the realisation of these aspirations as it was 
concerned with the State's  Constitutional obligations in relation to housing: a 
Constitutional issue of fundamental importance to the development of South Africa's 
new constitutional order.  
 
3.4.1 The case for inclusion in the social security scheme  
 
It can be said from the above analysis of these core values of the constitution 
undertaken in the previous section that in terms of the realisation of particular rights 
the Court has been most generous in its interpretation of the provisions of the 
Constitution. The first case that afforded the court the opportunity to grapple with 
these issues was the grootboom145 case. In this case the respondents based their claim 
on two constitutional provisions: s 26 of the Constitution, which provides that 
‘everyone has the right of access to adequate housing, thereby imposing an obligation 
upon the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures to ensure the 
progressive realisation of this right within its available resources; and s 28(1) (c) of 
the Constitution which provides that children have the right to shelter’. The 
respondents  contended that the minimum obligation incurred by the State in terms of 
s 26 entitled all the respondents, including those adult respondents without children, 
to  shelter and that the children's unqualified right to shelter included in s 28(1)(c) 
placed the right of children to that minimum obligation beyond doubt.  
 
The state placed evidence before the Court of the legislative and other 
measures they had adopted concerning housing. The central thrust of the housing 
development policy evidenced by the legislation and  other measures in place was to 
provide citizens and permanent residents with access to permanent residential 
structures with secure tenure ensuring internal and external privacy and to provide 
adequate protection against the elements146. The point that can be made here is that 
the government is failing in meeting its convention obligation to accord refugees in 
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their territory the same preferential treatment as non-nationals in this case permanent 
residents in their exclusion of refugees in their policy plan. 
 
The High Court held that s 28(1) (c) of the Constitution obliged the State to 
provide rudimentary shelter to children and their parents on demand if the parents 
were unable to shelter their children. That this obligation existed independently of and 
in addition to the obligation to take reasonable legislative and other measures in terms 
of s 26 of the Constitution and that the State was bound to provide this rudimentary 
shelter irrespective of the availability of resources.  
 
This means that sometimes the socio-economic rights of extremely vulnerable 
groups have to be realised irrespective of the availability of resources. Thus an 
argument can be made that the government has to make a policy plan which can be 
implemented with immediate effect to safe guard the rights of the vulnerable group of 
refugees especially with regard to the availability of social grants. 
 
In Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the  
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa147, the Court made some very definitive 
statements concerning the adjudication of socio-economic rights.  They said that,  
‘The question of how socio-economic rights were to be enforced was a difficult 
issue which had to be carefully explored on a case-by-case basis considering 
the terms and context of the relevant Constitutional provision and its 
application to the circumstances of the case.148  
It held further that,  
‘Interpreting a right in its context required the consideration of two types of 
context. On the one hand, rights had to be understood in their textual setting, 
which required a consideration of chap 2 and the Constitution as a whole. On 
the other hand, rights also had to be understood in their social and historical 
context149. 
 
The Constitutional Court laid a very important benchmark in this respect 
concerning one’s understanding of litigating and realising socio-economic rights in 
the South African context. This standard or pronouncement is crucial for our purposes 
as it defines the parameters in which an argument for the extension of the social 
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149 Paragraphs [22] and [24] at 61H - 62A/B and 62D 
 51
grants system to refugees can be made. It lays out important considerations that need 
to be taken into account in the formulation of the necessary argument and in fact 
enhances the scope of the argument by increasing the nature and amount of the issues 
that must be taken into consideration when such a deliberation is made.  
 
In this regard the terms and context, which includes the social and historical, 
of the right to social assistance has to be understood in the light of South Africa’s 
history whereby millions of people were forced to live in abject poverty. The 
provision of this right shows the new democratic dispensation and government’s 
commitment to not only poverty relief but human development and the notion of 
assisting people out of the degrading conditions of abject poverty and in that way 
uplifting them out of poverty in recognition of their right to human dignity.   
 
When one applies the circumstances of the case where the claimants of the 
right are refugees, the argument can be made that these are people whom South Africa 
has willingly extended its welcome and to whom they have undertaken to provide 
protection to which is human rights and refugee-centered and to whose minimum 
standards they promised to adhere and who face many socio-economic related 
challenges in South Africa. In this case concerning public relief the Convention puts 
the obligation to provide the same treatment to refugees as is accorded nationals.  
Thus some minimum core obligation has to be met in this respect.  
 
This is in accordance with the Court’s holding that, ‘the State was obliged to 
take positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty, 
homelessness or intolerable housing’150. This is the basis on which all motivation for 
the inclusion of refugees into the policy framework lies, especially for the most 
vulnerable of refugees who are made doubly vulnerable by their status and their 
seeking to integrate into a foreign community with limited or no resources, taking into 
account the context of flight .  
 
The Court also held that s 26 as a whole placed, at the very least, a negative 
obligation upon the State and all other entities and persons to desist from preventing 
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or impairing the right of access to adequate housing. It can be argued therefore that 
the government is negatively impairing the right of refugees to not only human 
dignity but their right to access social assistance by their exclusion in the social 
assistance Act. 
 
With regard to core minimum obligation, the Court, recognised that the 
determination of a minimum obligation in the context of the right to have access to 
adequate housing, for example, presented difficult questions because the needs were 
so diverse: some needed land; others, both land and houses; still others,  financial 
assistance. They then determined that the crucial issue or the fundamental question in 
this regard and in terms of the Constitution was whether ‘the measures taken by the 
State to realise the right afforded by s 26 was reasonable’151.  
 
Thus the standard by which state action or inaction is to be measured is that of 
reasonableness. Hence in this case the question would be whether the exclusion of 
refugees from the social security scheme is reasonable in the circumstances. This has 
to take into account their circumstances where some of them are forced because of 
their inability to integrate successfully, to live in abject poverty with no-one that they 
can turn to for any assistance whatsoever. They can not turn to their own governments 
through their embassies for assistance nor can they go back to their home countries 
which are the source of their problems if the ‘going gets tough’ like other migrants 
can.  
 
They are vulnerable forced migrants whose particular vulnerabilities were 
recognised by the International community when it put in place the protection system 
to safe guard them from these very problems and thus accorded them the same rights 
as those given to nationals with regard to public relief. Thus for the South African 
government as a willing signatory of these conventions to deny them any form of 
public relief is short of criminal under the circumstances and unreasonable and 
therefore unconstitutional.  
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In their discussion of what would constitute reasonableness the Court held 
that, ‘a program excluding a significant segment of society would not be reasonable’. 
The court further held that the programs adopted by the State fell short of the 
requirements of s 26(2) in particular in that no provision was made for relief to the 
categories of people in desperate need. They held that the Constitution obliged the 
State to act positively to ameliorate these conditions. This obligation was to devise 
and implement a coherent, co-coordinated program designed to provide access to 
housing, healthcare, sufficient food and water and social security  to those unable to 
support themselves and their dependants such as extremely vulnerable refugees and 
newly arrived asylum seekers152.  
 
This reasoning and this standard set by the Court is absolutely critical to the 
realisation of the socio-economic rights of very vulnerable refugees. Reasonableness 
also had to be understood in the context of the Bill of Rights as a  whole, especially 
the constitutional requirement that everyone be treated with care and concern and the 
fundamental constitutional value of human dignity153 which refugees deserve in terms 
of the right to non-discrimination contained in the covenants.  
 
With regard to progressive realisation of the right the Court held that, ‘the goal 
of the Constitution was, however, that the basic needs of all in our society be 
effectively met and the requirement of progressive realisation meant that the State had 
to take steps to achieve this goal. That meant that accessibility had to be progressively 
facilitated, involving the examination of legal, administrative, operational and 
financial hurdles which had to be lowered over time’154. This would be with relevant 
to the rest of the refugee population that one wouldn’t normally characterise as 
extremely vulnerable but who will obviously be rendered vulnerable by continued 
legal and policy exclusion as is the practice currently. 
 
With regard to the right of children section 28(1) (c) of the Constitution provides:  
 '(1) every child has the right -  . . .  
 (c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services.'   
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In terms of this section it means that refugee children have the right to child support 
grant and therefore the provisions of the Social Assistance Act which exclude 
refugees from their ambit are unconstitutional and violate this fundamental and 
unqualified right. Just as one cannot talk about children’s right to housing in exclusion 
of their parents as held by the court in Grootboom one cannot talk about children’s 
unqualified right to social assistance without making provision for the parents to 
access it on their behalf.  
 
Furthermore unaccompanied minors and separated children represent a distinct 
category of vulnerable persons. In terms of the United Nations Charter on the Rights 
of the Child (UNCRC), South Africa is obliged to provide special protection to 
refugee children appropriate to their specific circumstances and vulnerability155. 
These children should be dealt with in two possible ways. The first would be to 
recognise refugee children as one of the categories of non-South Africans to whom 
social assistance will be made available. The alternative would be to make specific 
reference to refugee children in each of the clauses that deal with grants to children. 
 
This means that there is a double argument for the provision of social 
assistance to extremely vulnerable refugees, not only in terms of their capacity as 
refugees as conferred on them by the refugee convention but also as parents of 
children under South African law. Furthermore these rights are justiciable as 
reiterated by the Constitutional Court in the certification judgment when it held that 
Socio-economic rights are expressly included in the Bill of Rights; they cannot 
be said to exist on paper only. Section 7(2) of the  Constitution requires the 
State 'to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights' 
and the courts are constitutionally bound to ensure that they are protected and 
fulfilled. The question is therefore not whether socio-economic rights are 
justiciable under our Constitution156.  
 
 
This therefore means that there is a definite positive duty on the state to realise 
these rights, since the government is constitutionally bound to fulfill these rights. 
Thus the wording of the social assistance act needs to be reworded to include refugees 
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as an express category of beneficiaries entitled to social assistance and poverty 
alleviation grants.  
  
The court has held that all the rights in our Bill of Rights are inter-related and 
mutually supporting and there can be no doubt that  human dignity, freedom and 
equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied those who have no food, 
clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to all people therefore enables 
them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in chap 2157. The realisation of these rights is 
also key to the advancement of race and gender equality and the evolution of a society 
in which men and women are equally able to  achieve their full potential. This 
construction of the purpose and desired effect of socio-economic rights as contained 
in the Constitution is especially important in the light of the fact that the Refugees Act 
expressly entitles refugees to all the rights that are in the Bill of Rights and therefore 
this interpretation of the rights must be applied to the situation and plight of refugees.  
 
When one considers the vulnerable situation of refugees in South Africa and 
the fact that they get no form of government financial support in their efforts to 
successfully integrate, it becomes obvious that this treatment of refugees on their part 
is unconstitutional and violates their right to human dignity and equality through their 
inability to access any form of social assistance. And that the constitutional acceptable 







                                                                                                                                                                      
156 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the  Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC)  
157 This context in which the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted was also described by Chaskalson P  in 
Soobramoney: ‘We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of people 
are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, 
inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water or to adequate health services. 
These conditions already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address 
them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be human dignity, freedom and 
equality, lies at the heart of our new Constitutional order. For as long as these conditions continue to 
 56
3.4.2 The relevant international law and its impact  
 
Section 39158 of the Constitution obliges a court to consider international law as a 
tool to interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In Makwanyane Chaskalson P, in the 
context of s 35(1) of the interim Constitution, said:   
. . . Public international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. 
They may both be used under the section as tools of interpretation. International 
agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a framework 
within which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for that 
purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as the 
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European 
Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, and, in 
appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the International 
Labour Organisation, may provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of 
particular provisions of [the Bill of Rights..159  
 
The relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to be 
attached to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary. However, 
where the relevant principle of international law binds South Africa, such as the 
Refugee Convention it may be directly applicable. And in this regard the government 
has to fulfill some minimum core obligation of the rights granted. This minimum core 
obligation is determined generally by having regard to the  needs of the most 
vulnerable group that is entitled to the protection of the right in question. 
 
 It is in this context that the concept of minimum core obligation must be 
understood in international law. Issues of development and social welfare  are raised 
in respect of those who cannot afford to provide themselves with housing. The poor 
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are particularly vulnerable and their needs require special attention. Thus it is in this 
context that the importance of socio-economic rights is most apparent.  
 
If under s 27 the  State has in place programs to provide adequate social 
assistance to those who are otherwise unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, this is relevant to the State's obligations in respect of other socio-
economic rights. S27 speaks to the positive obligation imposed upon the State. It 
requires the State to devise a comprehensive and workable plan to meet its obligations 
in terms of the subsection. 
 
The Khosa/Mahlaule160 case which is the most important case for our 
purposes involved a Constitutional challenge to certain provisions of the Social 
Assistance Act 59 of 1992 and the Welfare Laws Amendment Act 106 of 1997, 
including provisions of the latter Act that had not yet been brought into force. These 
provisions restricted access to social assistance to South African citizens only. The 
practical effect was that permanent residents aged persons and children who would 
otherwise have qualified for social assistance but for the requirement of citizenship – 
were excluded.  
 
As the minority judgment by Judge Ngcobo succinctly points out, this case is 
different from previous socio-economic rights cases, namely Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
and Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 (5) 
SA 721 (CC)). In these cases, the Constitutional Court (the Court) had to evaluate the 
compliance of State programmes (or their contents) with the constitutional 
requirements. In Khosa/Mahlaule, it was specifically the exclusion of non-citizens 







3.5 The Court’s approach to socio-economic rights 
 
In Grootboom the court held that socio-economic rights in the Constitution are 
closely related to the founding values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 
Yacoob J observed that, ‘the proposition that the rights in the Constitution are inter-
related and are equally important has immense human and practical significance in a 
society founded on these values’.161  
 
The Court found that most of the rights concerned in all of these cases were 
intersecting rights, which reinforce one another at the path of intersection. For 
instance in the Khosa case, it found that the right to life and dignity, which are 
intertwined in the Constitution, were implicated in the claims made by the applicants. 
In the Dawood162 case the Court found that human dignity was a value that informed 
the interpretation of many, possibly all other rights.  
 
The Court held further that human dignity as contained in s10 was not just a 
value fundamental to the Constitution but it was also a justiciable and enforceable 
right. The court believes that s1 of the Constitution imposes a clear need and 
obligation on government to advance the human rights and enhance the achievement 
of equality. Thus there is a need for the government to enhance the achievement of 
equality for refugees and to concretely affirm their human dignity as contained in s1. 
This can be done through either their inclusion in the social security scheme or 
through the provision of material assistance in light of the tremendous difficulties they 
face in integrating.  
 
The Court also looks at the impact that the denial of the specific right has on 
equality and human dignity. The right to equality is seen as a foundational right of the 
Constitution. In the Khosa/Mahlaule case it held that, ‘equality in respect of access to 
socio-economic rights is implicit in the reference to “everyone” being entitled to 
access in terms of s27 of the Constitution’. Which means that in line with this 
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reasoning, those who are unable to survive without social assistance are equally 
destitute and thus equally in need of such assistance, such as vulnerable refugees.  
 
The Court did hold that the realisation of these rights requires a balancing act 
however. It held that it was important to realise that even where the state may be able 
to justify not paying benefits to everyone who is entitled to those benefits under 
section 27 on the grounds that to do so would be unaffordable, the criteria upon which 
they choose to limit the payment of those benefits (in this case citizenship) had to be 
consistent with the Bill of Rights as a whole.163  
 
Thus if the means chosen by the legislature to give effect to the state's positive 
obligation under section 27 unreasonably limits other constitutional rights, that too 
must be taken into account. When the rights to life, dignity and equality are 
implicated in cases dealing with socio-economic rights, they have to be taken into 
account along with the availability of human and financial resources in determining 
whether the state has complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness.  
 
This is, however, not a closed list and all relevant factors have to be taken into 
account in this exercise.  And furthermore what is relevant may vary from case to case 
depending on the particular facts and circumstances.  
 
In the Khosa/Mahlaule case the Court held that,  
What makes this case different to other cases that have previously been 
considered by this Court is that, in addition to the rights to life and dignity, the social-
security scheme put in place by the state to meet its obligations under section 27 of 
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3.5.1 Ambit of right to access to social assistance in terms of s27 (c)  
 
The court adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of rights.165  The 
bill of rights the court said, ‘expressly enshrines the rights of all people in our 
country’. 166  
 
3.5.2 The reasonableness of the legislative scheme167
 
The court held that when dealing with the issue of reasonableness the context 
is all important. It is necessary to have regard to purpose served by social security for 
example and the relevance of the citizenship requirement to that purpose.  One also 
has to look at the impact of the exclusion of permanent residence in this case and also 
refugees for our purpose. It is also important to have regard to the impact that this has 
on other intersecting rights for instance the reference to everyone in the clause 
containing the right to access means that equality rights are directly implicated. 168   
 
 
3.5.3 Purpose of the Right of Access to Social Security  
 
The right of access to social security is for those who are unable to support 
themselves and their dependents is entrenched because as a society South Africa 
values human beings and wants to ensure that people are afforded their basic needs. A 
society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are accessible to all if it is 
to be a society in which human dignity, freedom and equality are foundational.169   
 
3.5.4 The reasonableness of citizenship as a criterion of differentiation  
 
The court held that while it was necessary to differentiate between people and 
groups of people in society by classification in order for the state to allocate rights, 
duties, immunities, privileges, benefits or even disadvantages and to provide efficient 
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and effective delivery of social services, those classifications had to satisfy the 
constitutional requirement of "reasonableness" in section 27(2)170. In the case of 
Khosa, the state had chosen to differentiate between citizens and non-citizens.  
 
The Court held that the differentiation, if it is to pass constitutional muster, 
could not be arbitrary or irrational nor can it manifest a naked preference. There has to 
be a rational connection between that differentiating law and the legitimate 
government purpose it is designed to achieve.  The Court held further that a 
differentiating law or action, which does not meet these standards, would be in 
violation of section 9(1) and section 27(2) of the Constitution.  
 
The government argued that citizenship is a criteria used in all developing 
countries. To which the court replied that not all developing countries had a 
Constitution in which “everyone” has the right to access social security, and thus their 
immigration and welfare laws would not necessary be the same as South Africa’s.  
The proper constitutional interpretation provides that a person need not be a citizen in 
order to qualify for access to social assistance.   
 
3.5.5 Financial considerations 
 
The court did however accept the concern that non-citizens may become a 
financial burden on the country and legitimately so and that they were compelling 
reasons as to why social benefits should not be made available to all who are in South 
Africa irrespective of their immigration status. With regard to illegal immigrants for 
example the court saw the need and the right of the state to be able to differentiate and 
ascribe duties and obligations accordingly.   
 
The court did however go on to make a very fundamental observation in this 
regard, which is important for our purposes, as it applies directly to refugees.  It said 
that,  
‘The exclusion of all non-citizens who are destitute, however, irrespective of 
their immigration status, fails to distinguish between those who have become 
part of our society and have made their homes in South Africa, (this would 
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also apply to refugees), and those who have not. It may be reasonable to 
exclude from the legislative scheme workers who are citizens of other 
countries, visitors and illegal residents, who have only a tenuous link with this 
country. The position of permanent residents is, however, quite different to 
that of temporary or illegal residents. They reside legally in the country and 
may have done so for a considerable length of time. Like citizens, they have 
made South Africa their home’.171  
 
 
The government argued that the inclusion of permanent residence would 
impose an impermissibly high financial burden on the state. To which the court held 
that limiting the cost of social welfare was a legitimate government concern but that it 
had to be done in accordance with the Constitution and its values. This is because as 
the court pointed out quite succinctly, ‘we have to pay for the constitutional 
commitment to develop a caring society, and granting access to socio-economic rights 
to all who make their homes here. 172
  
In the case of the permanent residence for example the court was of the view 
that Immigration can be controlled in ways other than allowing immigrants to make 
their permanent homes here, and then abandoning them to destitution if they fall upon 
hard times. The court was therefore sending a clear message that deliberately allowing 
people into the country and then abandoning them to destitution is unacceptable.  
 
This is precisely what the government is doing by allowing refugees into the 
country and giving them legal status in terms of the Refugees Act and then through 
their inability to access social assistance abandoning the most vulnerable amongst 
them such as disabled and aged refugees, women at risk, refugee children and 
extremely poor refugee families to destitution.   
 
The development of a system of social grants has been a key pillar of the 
government’s strategy to fight poverty and to promote human development. The right 
to enjoy asylum therefore should not be willfully subjected to conditions that promote 
abject poverty. It is in South Africa’s best interest to promote the human development 
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of refugees so that when they go back to their countries of origin they can make a 
meaningful contribution there and help to rebuild their countries. 
 
This will hopefully reduce the risk and potential of further and future conflict 
in those regions and thus in this way South Africa would contribute to the eradication 
of the root causes of refugee flows and their consequences. This is in fact contained in 
the Department of Home Affairs’ policy document on refugee protection, in which it 
states that, ‘Furthermore, allowing refugees to use their skills or develop new ones 
while in exile will facilitate meaningful reintegration in their countries of origin when 
they are able to return’.173   
 
The court further held that the fact that the differentiation between citizens and 
non-citizens maybe rational does not mean that it is not an unfairly discriminatory 
criterion to use to allocate benefits. They employed the s9 unfair discrimination test 
developed in Harksen v Lane and employed in the President of RSA v Hugo.   
According to this test if differentiation is based on a listed ground of s 9 (3) it is then 
presumed that the discrimination is unfair by s 9 (5).  
 
In the case of Khosa/Mahlaule the ground of citizenship was not listed but 
analogous to the listed grounds and therefore there wasn’t a presumption in favor of 
unfairness.  This is critical for our purposes, as “refugee status” is also not a listed 
ground. This means that the way in which the Court formulates the unfair 
discrimination test in this case will be of value to trying to establish a particular 
standard of protection and treatment for refugees in this regard.   
 
Thus if the differentiating ground is not listed it means that unfairness first has 
to be established for the differentian to be unconstitutional. In President of the 
Republic of South Africa and another v Hugo Goldstone J stated that:  
"At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that the 
purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a 
society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect 
regardless of their membership of particular groups. The achievement of such a 
society in the context of our deeply in egalitarian past will not be easy, but that that is 




In this regard the court held that to determine whether the impact of the 
differentiation on the particular was unfair or not it was necessary to look at three 
things. Firstly to look at the group who had had been disadvantaged; secondly to look 
at the nature of the power in terms of which the discrimination was effected; and 
thirdly to look at the nature the interest which had been affected by the discrimination.  
The underlying principles of dignity, life and equality are the vital interests that had to 
be remembered at all times.   
 
As stated in Hoffman174, ‘that "at the heart of the prohibition of unfair 
discrimination is the recognition that under our Constitution all human beings, 
regardless of their position in society, must be accorded equal dignity." To be 
considered an analogous ground of differentiation to those listed in section 9(3) the 
classification must, therefore, have an adverse effect on the dignity of the individual, 
or some other comparable effect.  In Larbi-Odam the discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship was held to be unfair discrimination.  
 
The main determining factor regarding the unfairness of the discrimination is 
the impact it has on the person or group discriminated against. The court looks at a 
number of issues in this regard. It looks at the position of the claimants in society. In 
our case it is an extremely vulnerable group in desperate need of some form of social 
assistance. It also looks to see if they have suffered in the past from patterns of 
discrimination.  
 
In our case refugees have not been historically disadvantaged although one 
could argue that refugees properly construed although not recognised at the time 
during the apartheid era were victims of discriminatory patterns. They have however 
been discriminated against since South Africa made a commitment to their protection 
in the signing of the refugee conventions and in the policies made in terms of the 
green paper and the white paper. They are numerous examples of systemic 
discrimination and disadvantage, least of that is their exclusion from the social 
assistance act, in clear violation of South Africa’s commitment to provide an enabling 
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environment for refugees to achieve self sufficiency. 
 
The court did however hold that if the purpose is not manifestly directed at 
impairing the complainant but is aimed at achieving a worthy and important societal 
goal such as furthering equality for all, then it would most probably not be 
discriminatory. This cannot be implied by the present government policy of exclusion 
of refugees however. The other question that the court asks with due regard to the 
above and other relevant questions is the extent to which the discrimination has 
affected the rights or interests of the complainants. They also look at whether it has 
led to an impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes an impairment 
of a comparably serious nature.  
 
These factors do not constitute a closed list however. It is their cumulative 
effect that must be examined and in respect of which a determination must be made as 
to whether the discrimination is unfair. In Brink v Kitshoff the court held that s8175 
which is the equality clause, was adopted in recognition of the fact that discrimination 
against people who are members of a disfavoured group can lead to patterns of group 
disadvantage and harm. Such discrimination the court said is unfair because it builds 
and entrenches inequality amongst different groups in our society.   
 
There is no doubt that refugees are part of a vulnerable group in society who 
are worthy of constitutional protection.  We are dealing here with intentional, 
statutorily sanctioned unequal treatment of a segment of the South African 
community. This has a strong stigmatising effect. In the Khosa case the court held that 
the fact that permanent residents had to pay taxes (as do refugees) and then have 
unequal access to benefits created an impression that they were somehow inferior to 
citizens and therefore less worthy of social assistance. The court went on further to 
make a very important point, that the decisions about the allocation of public benefits 







3.5.6 Impact of exclusion 
 
The exclusion of permanent residents (and also refuges who are in a similar 
situation as that of permanent residents) from the social security scheme, the court 
held, forces them into relationships of dependency upon families, friends and 
communities n which they live, none of whom agreed to sponsor their immigration to 
South Africa176.  These families who might need social assistance themselves are thus 
asked to shoulder a burden that is not asked of other citizens.  
 
Therefore the denial of the welfare benefits impacted not only permanent 
residents but also the communities with which they have contact. This places an 
undue burden on those who take on this responsibility and is likely to have a serious 
impact on the dignity of the permanent residents concerned who are cast in the role of 
supplicants. The denial of the right is total the Court said, and the consequences of the 
denial grave. This is because they are relegated to the margins of society and are 
deprived of what maybe essential to enable them to enjoy other right vested in them 
under the Constitution and the conventions for pour purposes.  
 
Denying their right under s 27 therefore affects them in a most fundamental 
way and therefore the denial is unfair.177 Of crucial importance to this analysis was the 
fact that the Constitution provided that everyone has the right to have access to social 
assistance if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents. Thus the 
exclusion of permanent residence from the social security scheme was discriminatory 
and unfair and unjustifiable under s 36 of the Constitution.  
 
In the final analysis when the court employed the balancing act necessary in 
these considerations, it held that providing access to social assistance to all who live 
permanently in South Africa and the impact that such denial has on their life and 
dignity far outweighs the financial and immigration considerations. The denial did not 
constitute a reasonable legislative measure as contemplated by s 27 (2).  The court 
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 178 In 1997, the Green Paper on International Migration declared the Aliens Control Act (one of the last remainders of 
apartheid legislation) as unfit for refugee protection and finally, based on the recommendations of White Paper Task 
Team appointed in March 1998 by the Minister of Home Affairs, Refugees Bill was passed by Parliament in November 
1998 that came into force in April 2000 as Refugee Act 130. 
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also found that the internal limitation of reasonableness of s26 and 27 was enough to 
make it unjustifiable in terms of s36.  
 
This is because the Constitution vests the right to social security in "everyone" 
and by excluding permanent residents from the scheme for social security, the 
legislation limited their rights in a manner that affects their dignity and equality in 
material respects. Dignity and equality are founding values of the Constitution and lie 
at the heart of the Bill of Rights. Sufficient reason for such invasive treatment of the 
rights of permanent residents has not been established. The exclusion of permanent 
residents is therefore inconsistent with section 27 of the Constitution and in this same 












This paper addressed the unconstitutionality of the dichotomy between policy 
and legislation on the one hand and the realities of being an asylum seeker or refugee 
in South Africa. It looked at how the commitments and obligations that are clearly 
outlined at a legislative level concerning social security can be legally realised at a 
policy and a practical level by refugees in South Africa. The reality of the refugee in 
South Africa was set out and the principles of international protection and their 
attendant rights clearly defined within the constitutional parameters to make the 
argument that a constitutional imperative exists to facilitate the realisation and 
inclusion of refugees in the social security scheme. And thus in terms of constitutional 
standards it is recommended that the Social Assistance Act be changed to include 
vulnerable refugees, who meet the means test, in its ambit.  
 
 The Refugees Act proclaims a progressive commitment to refugee protection 
in line with international standards178. According to Regulation 15(1) (C) of Section 
27B of the Refugees Act, refugee protection is understood as having access to basic 
human rights.  One of the four basic international standards of treatment includes 
access and protection of the refugee’s security rights. Security rights include 
protection from physical attack and assistance to meet basic human needs.  
 
The heart of this paper was that since South Africa has made this commitment 
to uphold internationally sound protection it has a duty to practically realise this 
therefore, and it has been conclusively established that constitutionally speaking the 
South African government has to provide some sort of material or social assistance to 
refugees, in line with these principles. It has been established that indeed a high 
constitutional standard exists which mandates for the inclusion of refugees in the 






As the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has pointed out, 
‘being a refugee means more than being an alien.  It means living in exile and 
depending on others for such basic needs as food, clothing and shelter’.179 Refugees 
are not a homogenous group and they have very different practical experiences and 
problems in their host countries. However, whatever their background and wherever 
they seek refuge, all too often refugees share a common problem: their socio-
economic rights are always in jeopardy, and they face practical problems in accessing 
the economic and social entitlements that they do have, as is illustrative of the South 
African example180.   
 
The South African example highlights the fact that asylum seekers and 
refugees in urban settings could be more vulnerable than refugees in rural or camp-
based settings making the issue of material assistance a very significant issue that is 
noteworthy of serious consideration. Urban refugees who are made vulnerable by the 
harsh socio-economic conditions cannot be excluded from policies that are meant to 
protect vulnerable populations.  
 
With the largest ‘urban refugee’ program in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa 
was seen as  providing a critical space in which policies relating to the access of social 
assistance could be properly defined, in light of the hardships that urban refugees face 
in integrating and as one that needed strong legal motivation for implementation.  The 
broadness and generosity of the Constitution provided a good legal context to 
articulate minimum standards of protection that are in line with international 
principles, which can be used as a model of how international protection in this regard 
can be achieved in a manner that safe guards and respects the human dignity of 
refugees as a vulnerable people group.  
  
Taking on international obligations involves assuming the continuing 
responsibility to ensure that those obligations are fulfilled and that responsibility 
attaches to the State.  Where a Convention article imposes positive obligations it will 
have two aspects; - 1) to require the introduction of legislation or an administrative 
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scheme to protect the right. The administrative scheme has to be operated 
competently so as to achieve its aim however. There is a stage where the dictates of 
humanity require the state to intervene to prevent any person within its territory 
suffering dire consequences as a result of deprivation of sustenance. For example, 
material assistance is sometimes necessary to ensure basic survival. Therefore where 
treatment humiliates or debases an individual this shows a lack of respect for or a 
diminishing of his or her human dignity.  This has obvious implication for policy. It’s 
an area in which the influence of human rights law and doctrine should be felt181 as 
has been argued in this paper. 
 
Under the UN Refugee Convention, protection of refugees’ socio-economic 
rights is thus not simply a question of humanitarian assistance, but is a matter of a le-
gally binding international obligation182.  The ECHR in the Soering Case said that, 
“the obligations and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of 
individual human rights require that’s that its provisions be interpreted and applied so 
as to make its safe guards practical and effective183 and this can only be achieved by 
the inclusion of refugees in the social security scheme in the South African context. 
 
This is the challenge for the government, international lawyers and refugee 
advocates. Article 14 of UDHR, “everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum 
from persecution’. This declaration is based on the recognition of the inherent dignity 
and worth of every human being. A refugee has to be seen as a rights holder and the 
UDHR is mentioned in the preamble of the Convention. The refugee is a beneficiary, 
beholden to the state with a status to which certain standards of treatment and certain 
guarantees attach184.  
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Up until now the main concern in terms of refugee protection in South Africa 
has been ensuring that the legal framework is put in place and properly established.  
However now that there is a fully established and very progressive legal framework 
that fully embodies the spirit and purport of the Conventions, the time has now come 
for us to consider the complex issue of facilitating the successful integration of this 
vulnerable group of people whom the South African government has conferred all 
these rights. This is evidenced even by the theme of last year’s world refugee day 
which focused on “home in exile: local integration.”  
 
Therefore since the legislative framework already exists the challenge for the 
government now is to take other measures for the realisation of the rights. This would 
include the inclusion of refugees as a sub category in all the relevant statutes that deal 
with socio-economic rights such as the Social Assistance Act. The government needs 
to create a comprehensive policy plan for the realisation of these rights and the 
legitimate inclusion of refugees. This Constitution also provides a basis for 
establishing a strong democratic and rights respecting society.  
 
The South African government committed itself to securing for refugees in 
South Africa full legal protection provided for under international law, which legal 
protection has been defined above and which legal protection was to include all the 
rights in the Bill of Rights as set out in the Constitution. This is in line with its stated 
objectives and commitment as set out in the draft white paper on refugee affairs which 
should therefore be realised accordingly and as mandated by the Constitution of the 
Republic. 
The basic but fundamental philosophy in the government's approach to 
refugee policy is unambiguous. As far as refugees are concerned, the 
government recognises that its responsibilities and obligations, and the 
quality and quantity of the measures which it is called upon to deliver 
pursuant to these obligations are set out in an essentially mandatory manner 
in international legal and human rights standards. The government has 
assumed these obligations both through its accession to the relevant 
international refugee and human rights instruments and by incorporating a 
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